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This paper is motivated by the empirical regularity that industries diﬀer greatly in the level of ﬁrm
turnover, and that entry and exit rates are positively correlated across industries. Our objective is to
investigate the eﬀect of sunk costs and, in particular, market size on entry and exit rates, and hence on
the age distribution of ﬁrms.
We analyze a stochastic dynamic model of a monopolistically competitive industry. Each ﬁrm’s
eﬃciency is assumed to follow a Markov process. We show existence and uniqueness of a stationary
equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit: eﬃcient ﬁrms survive while ineﬃcient ones leave the
market and are replaced by new entrants. We perform comparative dynamics with respect to the level
of sunk costs: entry costs are negatively and ﬁx e dp r o d u c t i o nc o s t sp o s i t i v e l yr e l a t e dt oe n t r ya n de x i t
rates. A central empirical prediction of the model is that the level of ﬁrm turnover is increasing in
market size. The intuition is as follows. In larger markets, price-cost margins are smaller since the
number of active ﬁrms is larger. This implies that the marginal surviving ﬁrm has to be more eﬃcient
than in smaller markets. Hence, in larger markets, the expected life span of ﬁr m si ss h o r t e r ,a n dt h ea g e
distribution of ﬁrms is ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated by that in smaller markets. In an extension
of the model with time-varying market size, we explore the comovements between market size and entry
and exit rates. It is shown that both entry and exit rates tend to rise over time in growing markets.
In the empirical part, the prediction on market size and ﬁrm turnover is tested on industries where
ﬁrms compete in well-deﬁned geographical markets of diﬀerent sizes. Using data on hair salons in
Sweden, we show that an increase in market size or ﬁxed costs shifts the age distribution of ﬁrms
towards younger ﬁrms, as predicted by the model.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L11, L13, D43
Keywords: ﬁrm turnover, monopolistic competition, industry dynamics, entry, exit, market size, ﬁrm
age distribution.1 Introduction
There is much simultaneous ﬁrm entry and exit going on at the industry level, and there is considerable
variation in ﬁrm turnover across industries.1 To explain these cross-industry diﬀerences in ﬁrm turnover
is one of the important research agendas in the ﬁeld of industrial economics. For example, Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) conclude their study as follows.
The high correlation between entry and exit across industries indicates that industries
diﬀer substantially in their degree of ﬁrm turnover. One area for further study is then
to identify the characteristics of industry technology and demand that give rise to across
industry diﬀerences in turnover.
It is probably fair to say that the cross-industry diﬀerences in ﬁrm turnover are not yet very well
understood. Although there are some notable exceptions (discussed below), there appear to be only a
few theories which make empirically testable predictions regarding the determinants of ﬁrm turnover.
This paper considers observable industry characteristics — sunk costs and, in particular, market size —
and explores their eﬀects on entry and exit rates in an imperfectly competitive industry. The same
factors should also be expected to cause cross-industry variations in gross job reallocation.2
We analyze a stochastic dynamic model of an imperfectly competitive industry. Upon entry, a new
ﬁrm gets an initial draw of its productive eﬃciency or the perceived quality of its product. Over time,
a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency is likely to change, as it is hit by idiosyncratic shocks. To illustrate, the perceived
quality of a restaurant is partly given by the chef’s skills. If the chef quits, the restaurant needs to hire a
new chef, who may turn out to be better or worse than the previous one. In stationary equilibrium, ﬁrms
follow a threshold exit policy: ﬁrms that are hit by a suﬃciently bad shock optimally decide to leave the
market and are replaced by new entrants. The focus of this paper is to relate the equilibrium rate of ﬁrm
turnover to entry costs, ﬁxed production (or opportunity) costs, and market size. Since the equilibrium
distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies depends on industry characteristics, our model also provides testable
predictions regarding the well-documented diﬀerences in productivity between and within industries.3
The central new prediction of the model is that the rate of ﬁrm turnover is increasing in market size.
The intuition is the following. In a free entry equilibrium, a rise in market size causes the population
of active ﬁrms to increase. This, in turn, leads to lower price-cost margins. Hence, there tend to be
t w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects on ﬁrms’ proﬁts: lower price-cost margins and larger sales. In equilibrium, the
overall eﬀect is positive for more eﬃcient ﬁrms, and negative for less eﬃcient ﬁrms, and so the marginal
surviving ﬁrm has to be more eﬃcient in larger markets. Hence, in larger markets, the expected life
span of ﬁrms is shorter, and the rate of ﬁrm turnover larger. It follows that the age distribution of ﬁrms
in larger markets is shifted toward younger ﬁrms. A direct implication of the stronger “selection eﬀect”
in larger markets is that ﬁrms are on average more eﬃcient.
Our result on market size and ﬁrm turnover is closely related to the price competition eﬀect in
standard oligopoly models, according to which equilibrium prices (and hence price-cost margins) fall
with an increase in the number of ﬁrms. It is commonly believed that the price competition eﬀect implies
that, in a free entry equilibrium, the number of active ﬁrms rises less than proportionally with market
size (see, e.g., Sutton (1997a)). This is, in fact, what Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) ﬁnd in their seminal
empirical study on local service ﬁrms in isolated US towns. More recent papers by Asplund and Sandin
(1999) and Campbell and Hopenhayn (2002) provide further empirical support. In our model, however,
ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated goods and diﬀer in their eﬃciency level, and so the price competition eﬀect
does not necessarily imply that the number of ﬁrms rises less than proportionally with market size.
1Caves (1998) provides a recent survey of the empirical literature on turnover and mobility of ﬁrms. See also Sutton
(1997b) and Cabral (1997).
2See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) for a survey of the literature on gross job creation and destruction.
3See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a review of the evidence.
1Another prediction of our model is that ﬁrm turnover is lower in markets with higher entry costs.
As entry costs increase, fewer ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the market. This reduces the competitive
pressure and allows less eﬃcient ﬁrms to survive. The eﬀect of ﬁxed costs is more subtle. An increase
in ﬁxed costs also makes entry less attractive, which corresponds to fewer ﬁrms in the market and less
intense competition with higher equilibrium prices. There is, however, the opposing eﬀect that each
ﬁrm has to spend more on ﬁxed costs which reduces net proﬁts. In equilibrium, the overall eﬀect is
positive for more eﬃcient ﬁrms as they gain more from higher prices, and negative for less eﬃcient ﬁrms.
Consequently, the marginal surviving ﬁr mh a st ob em o r ee ﬃcient in markets with higher ﬁxed costs,
and the expected life span of ﬁr m si ss h o r t e r .
How can our predictions be tested empirically? The magnitude of the underlying ﬂuctuations in the
pattern of demand or technology is likely to vary greatly across industries. As pointed out by Sutton
(1997b), this factor may be of primary importance, but it is very diﬃcult to measure it or to control for
its impact empirically. This causes a serious problem for any empirical test of cross-industry predictions
on ﬁrm turnover. Fortunately, an attractive feature of the explanatory variable “market size” is that this
problem can be largely circumvented. The idea is to study turnover rates in geographically independent
(“local”) markets of diﬀerent sizes but within the same industry. This should control for most of those
factors that would diﬀer across industries. This is the route taken in the empirical part of the paper,
where we set out to test two predictions of our theory, using data on the age distribution of hair salons
in Sweden: ﬁrms tend to be younger in (i) larger markets, and (ii) markets with higher ﬁxed costs.
Using non-parametric tests of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance (Anderson (1996); Davidson and Duclos
(2000)), we ﬁnd empirical support for both predictions.
The starting point of the recent literature on stochastic dynamic industry equilibria with heteroge-
nous ﬁrms is the seminal paper by Jovanovic (1982).4 Jovanovic considers a perfectly competitive
industry where ﬁrms have diﬀerent but time-invariant eﬃciency levels. Firms only gradually learn their
types over time by observing their “noisy” cost realizations. Firms which learn that they are eﬃcient
grow and survive, while ﬁrms that obtain consistently negative information decline and eventually leave
the market. The model produces a rich array of empirical predictions on the relationship between ﬁrm
growth and survival on the one hand and ﬁrm age and size on the other. However, all ﬁrms eventually
learn their eﬃciency level, and so there is no ﬁrm turnover in the long run. Lambson (1991) considers
another model with atomistic price takers. In his paper, there are no idiosyncratic shocks but instead
common shocks to input price (and demand). In equilibrium, ﬁrms may choose diﬀerent technologies
and hence be aﬀected diﬀerently by the common shocks. The model predicts that the variability of ﬁrm
values is negatively related to the level of sunk costs. Some empirical evidence for this prediction is
given in Lambson and Jensen (1998) and Gschwandtner and Lambson (2002). Ericson and Pakes (1995)
analyze a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model. There are two sources of uncertainty in their model: the
outcomes of ﬁrms’ investments in “quality” are stochastic and ﬁrms are subject to (negative) aggregate
shocks. The equilibrium distribution of qualities at any time is itself stochastic. Few analytic restrictions
can be placed on equilibrium outcomes. Instead, the authors have developed a simulation package; see
Pakes and McGuire (1994).5
Hopenhayn (1992) is closely related to our model. The key diﬀerence between his model and ours
is the assumed form of competition: Hopenhayn considers a perfectly competitive industry. The main
prediction of his model is that ﬁrm turnover is negatively related to entry costs. Due to the absence of
the price competition eﬀect, however, market size has no eﬀect on entry and exit rates. There are a few
4Note that we study the properties of a stationary industry equilibrium; we do not analyze the life-cycle of an industry
as in Klepper (1996). For more evidence on how entry and exit rates are related to the evolution of an industry, see also
Carroll and Hannan (2000).
5The passive learning model by Jovanovic (1982) diﬀers from a number of other models (such as Ericson and Pakes
(1995), Hopenhayn (1992), and our model) in that the stochastic process generating the size of a ﬁrm is non-ergodic. This
is used by Pakes and Ericson (1998) to empirically distinguish between the two classes of models.
2other papers that build on Hopenhayn’s framework. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) apply a general
equilibrium version of the model to study the eﬀect of changes in ﬁring costs on total employment and
welfare. Bergin and Bernhardt (1999) consider business cycle eﬀects in a model of perfect competition.
Das and Das (1997) and Melitz (1999) both introduce monopolistic competition but assume a particular
demand structure. Das and Das analyze the eﬀect of entry adjustment costs on the convergence path to
the stationary state. Melitz considers the impact of trade costs in a two-country version of Hopenhayn’s
model. In his model, the eﬃciency of incumbents does not vary over time, and the death rate of
incumbents is exogenously given. There are no market size eﬀects on ﬁrm turnover.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model. Then, in Section 3, we
characterize (stationary) equilibrium, and show existence and uniqueness. In Section 4, we investigate
the comparative dynamics properties of the stationary equilibrium, which lie at the heart of the paper.
We extend the model in Section 5 by analyzing the case of growing and declining markets, and providing
results on the co-movements of entry and exit rates and market size. The robustness of the main results
is discussed in Section 6. In the empirical part of the paper, Section 7, we investigate our prediction on
market size and ﬁrm turnover, using Swedish data on hair salons. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2 The Model
We consider a stochastic dynamic model of an imperfectly competitive industry. There are a continuum
of consumers and a continuum of (potential) ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm produces a unique diﬀerentiated product,
and hence faces a downward-sloping demand curve. In a stochastic dynamic model, it is more convenient
to work with a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms rather than with a ﬁnite number of
oligopolistic players. First, if ﬁrms are atomistic, we do not have to worry about integer constraints. In
a free entry equilibrium, the value of a new entrant is exactly equal to its outside option. Second, with
a continuum of ﬁrms, idiosyncratic uncertainty washes out at the aggregate level. Hence, if uncertainty
enters at the individual level only, all aggregate variables are deterministic. Third, the assumption of
monopolistic competition greatly reduces the set of equilibria.
Firms diﬀer in their “eﬃciency levels”, or types, which are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Under
our leading interpretation, the shocks directly aﬀect ﬁrms’ marginal costs. In this case, the marginal
cost of each new entrant is independently drawn from the continuous cumulative distribution function
G(·)w i t hs u p p o r t[ 0 ,1]. An incumbent’s marginal cost in period t, ct,i sg i v e nb y
ct = ct−1 with probability α,
ct ∼ G(·)o t h e r w i s e , ( 1 )
where α ∈ [0,1), measures the persistence of an incumbent’s costs. The “shocks” to incumbents’
eﬃciencies are assumed to be ﬁrm speciﬁc. There is, however, an alternative interpretation where ﬁrms
diﬀer in the perceived quality of their product; see Example 2 below. In this case, a ﬁrm’s perceived
quality (relative to marginal cost) is negatively related to ﬁrm type c. For brevity, we will refer to c
as a ﬁrm’s marginal cost in the remainder of the paper. The simple stochastic process (1) allows us to
obtain closed-form solutions. Moreover, this particular Markov process can be motivated by a simple
economic model: the eﬃciency of a ﬁrm depends on the quality of its match with a manager. In each
period, the manager leaves the ﬁrm with (exogenous) probability 1−α. If the manager stays, the quality
of the ﬁrm-manager match (and thus the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency) remains unchanged. If the manager leaves,
however, the ﬁrm has to get a new manager from the pool of (potential) managers. The quality of the
ﬁrm-manager match is distributed according to G(·). Importantly, in Section 6 we show that the main
predictions of the paper remain unchanged if we replace (1) by a more general class of Markov processes
3with the property that a currently eﬃcient ﬁrm is more likely to be eﬃcient next period than a less
eﬃcient ﬁrm.
Regarding sunk costs, we assume that a ﬁrm has to pay an irrecoverable entry fee  >0w h e ni t
enters the market. Additionally, a ﬁrm faces a ﬁxed production (or opportunity) cost of φ>0p e r
period.6
Time is discrete and indexed by t.F i r m sh a v ea ni n ﬁnite horizon and maximize the discounted sum
of proﬁts. The common discount factor is denoted by δ ∈ [0,1). In each period, the timing is as follows.
1. Entry stage. The potential entrants decide whether to enter the market or, instead, take up the
outside option (the value of which is normalized to zero).
2. Learning stage. T h ee n t r a n t sa n dt h ei n c u m b e n t so b s e r v et h er e a l i z a t i o no ft h e i rc u r r e n tc o s t s ,ct.
3. Exit stage. The new entrants and incumbents decide whether to leave the market forever (and
take up the outside option) or not.
4. Output stage. The active ﬁrms play some “market game”, pay a ﬁxed production cost φ,a n d
receive proﬁts.
Let us make two remarks on the sequence of moves. First, potential entrants decide whether or not to
enter the market before knowing their current eﬃciency. This assumption is common to most dynamic
industry models. It allows us to avoid assumptions about the size of the pool of potential entrants
(other than that it is suﬃciently large to ensure there is always a positive mass of ﬁrms which do not
enter in equilibrium). This is of particular importance in our model as we are interested in the eﬀects
of market size. It seems plausible that the number of potential entrants is not independent of market
size. Fortunately, with the assumed sequence of moves, we can remain agnostic about this relationship.7
Second, new entrants are treated as incumbents at the exit stage, which takes place after ﬁrms have
learnt their current types. This sequence of moves gives rise to a convenient and novel mathematical
structure. In Section 6, we show that the assumption is not essential for the results.
Formally, the model can be described as an anonymous sequential game; see Jovanovic and Rosenthal
(1988). Let M denote the set of Borel measures on [0,1], and µ ∈ M, the measure of ﬁrms’ cost levels
at the output stage. That is, for any Borel set (or interval) A ⊂ [0,1], µ(A) gives the mass of active
ﬁrms with costs in A. The payoﬀ relevant state of the industry in period t, stage 4, can then be
summarized by µt, the measure of active ﬁrms’ types at the output stage. We conﬁne attention to
Markov strategies.8 Appealing to the law of large numbers (for a continuum of random variables), we
assume that all idiosyncratic uncertainty washes out at the aggregate level.9 Hence, the evolution of
the industry (from an arbitrary initial state µ0) is deterministic.
To allow for a large class of models describing competition at the output stage, we do not model
the “market game” explicitly. In particular, we do not specify ﬁrms’ strategic variables (prices or
6We could easily introduce a scrap value for exiting ﬁrms. However, any such scrap value would aﬀect equilibrium in
the same way as the ﬁxed cost φ.
7In Nocke (2000), a diﬀerent route is taken which also avoids making arbitrary assumptions about the relationship
between the size of the pool of potential entrants and market size. There, it is assumed that potential entrants, knowing
their current type, self-select into markets of diﬀerent size. Reassuringly, it is found that the central prediction of the
present paper is insensitive to the assumptions on the entry process.
8To focus on pure entry strategies, each potential entrant in period t is assigned a unique (and payoﬀ irrelevant) label
lt ∈ R. Entry decisions only depend on the ﬁrm’s label lt and last period’s industry state µt−1. An entry strategy is thus
am a p p i n gη : R ×M→{0,1}. An incumbents’ exit decision only depends on its own current costs ct, last period’s state
µt−1, and the mass of new entrants, Mt.A ne x i ts t r a t e g yi st h u sam a p p i n gχ :[ 0 ,1]×M×R+ →{0,1}.S i n c et h e r ei sn o
aggregate uncertainty and each ﬁrm is atomistic, the requirements on ﬁrms’ information could be weakened substantially.
For instance, incumbents may or may not condition their exit decisions on the current mass of entrants.
9See Feldman and Gilles (1985) and Uhlig (1996) for a precise statement of the conditions under which a law of large
numbers can be justiﬁed for a continuum of random variables.
4quantities) nor the details of the demand system. Instead, each ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt is summarized
by a reduced-form proﬁt function. A ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt depends on its own type, on market size,
and on the endogenous distribution of active ﬁrms. The equilibrium proﬁt (gross of ﬁxed costs) of a
type-c ﬁrm when the measure of ﬁrms is µ is denoted by
Sπ(c;µ) ≥ 0, (2)
where S is a measure of market size (e.g., the mass of consumers in the market). By writing a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt as in (2), we make a number of implicit assumptions. First, ﬁrms diﬀer only in their types; they are
symmetric in all other respects. Hence, if c denotes marginal costs, then the aggregate demand system
is symmetric and competition non-localized. Second, an increase in market size means a replication of
the population of consumers, leaving unchanged the distribution of preferences and income. Moreover,
ﬁrms’ marginal production costs are independent of output levels. This implies that market size enters
(2) in a multiplicative way.10 Of course, in equilibrium, the measure µ will depend on market size, but
it is taken as given at the output stage.
To be more speciﬁc, let us consider the case where c denotes marginal costs. Denote by SD(·;µ)
and P(·/S;µ) the demand and inverse demand functions, respectively, faced by an individual ﬁrm in
equilibrium when the measure of active ﬁrms is given by µ. In this case, equilibrium gross proﬁtc a nb e
written as
Sπ(c;µ) ≡ [p(c;µ) − c]SD(p(c;µ);µ)
=[ P(q(c;µ,S)/S;µ) − c]q(c;µ,S), (3)
where p(c;µ)a n dq(c;µ,S) are equilibrium price and output.
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions on the reduced-form proﬁt function.
(MON) The reduced-form proﬁtf u n c t i o nπ(·;µ) is strictly decreasing in c on [0,c(µ)),a n dπ (c;µ)=
0 for all c ∈ [c(µ),1],w h e r ec(µ) ∈ [0,1].
That is, ﬁrms with lower marginal costs have higher proﬁts. We allow for the possibility that some
ineﬃcient ﬁrms (the types above c(µ)) may not sell their products even when oﬀered at marginal cost
and hence make zero gross proﬁt.
Since the distribution of active ﬁrms is endogenous, we have to compare diﬀerent distributions. For
this purpose, we deﬁne a partial ordering, denoted by º,o nt h es e tM. Formally, let
µ0 % µ ⇔ {∀c ∈ [0,1],π (c;µ0) ≤ π(c;µ)},
and
µ0 Â µ ⇔ {µ0 % µ and ∀c ∈ [0,c(µ)),π (c;µ0) <π (c;µ)}.
Note that the ordering implies c(µ0) ≤ c(µ)f o rµ0 % µ.M e a s u r eµ0 is said to be (weakly) larger than
µ if µ0 º µ.M e a s u r e sµ0 and µ are said to be equivalent if µ0 ∼ µ.W ed e ﬁne the equivalence class of
measure µ as the set of Borel measures µ0 in M such that µ0 ∼ µ.
(DOM) If µ0([0,z]) ≥ µ([0,z]) for all z ∈ (0,1],t h e nµ0 % µ. If, in addition, the inequality is strict
for some e z ∈ (0,c(µ)),t h e nµ0 Â µ.
In words, the measure of active ﬁrms is larger if the mass of active ﬁrms is larger and the population
of ﬁrms more eﬃcient. We can remain completely agnostic about the eﬀect on proﬁts of increasing
“average eﬃciency” of ﬁrms while reducing the mass of active ﬁrms. Assumption (DOM) implies that
ar i s ei nt h em a s so fﬁrms reduces the proﬁto fa n ya c t i v eﬁr ma n dt h u st h ev a l u eo fa ne n t r a n t .
(ORD) The set (M,º) is completely ordered.
10The assumption that market size enters multiplicatively into the gross proﬁt function can easily be relaxed; see Nocke
(2000).
5Complete ordering of (M,º) is a common property of models of symmetric and non-localized com-
petition. The assumption rules out that some ﬁrm makes larger proﬁts when the distribution of active
ﬁr m si sg i v e nb yµ rather than µ0, while some other ﬁrm is better oﬀ under µ0.I fﬁrms diﬀer only in
their types and are symmetric otherwise, then all types should have the same ranking of distributions.11
(CON) The reduced-form proﬁtf u n c t i o nπ(c;µ) is continuous.12
For two of our main comparative dynamics results, we have to impose further structure on the
reduced-form proﬁt function. The following two conditions summarize properties of a large class of
oligopoly models with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
A.1 For µ0 Â µ, the proﬁtd i ﬀerence |π(c;µ) − π(c;µ0)| is strictly decreasing in c on [0,c(µ)).
A.2 For µ0 Â µ, the proﬁtr a t i oπ(c;µ0)/π(c;µ) is strictly decreasing in c on [0,c(µ0)).
Consider an increase in the distribution of active ﬁrms. By deﬁnition, this causes the gross proﬁt
of any ﬁrm to decrease, provided the ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁti nt h eﬁrst place. Assumption A.1
says that eﬃcient ﬁrms suﬀer more than ineﬃcient ﬁrms in terms of the absolute decrease in proﬁt.
Assumption A.2 is the condition for our central result on the relationship between market size and
market turbulence. It says that the percentage decrease in gross proﬁt is larger for ineﬃcient ﬁrms than
for eﬃcient ones. While both general and intuitive, these properties appear to have remained widely
unnoticed in the literature.13
To improve our understanding of assumptions A.1 and A.2, the following proposition shows that
they are equivalent to properties of equilibrium prices and quantities.
Proposition 1 Suppose ﬁrm type c denotes marginal costs, and ﬁrms compete either in prices or in
quantities. That is, equilibrium proﬁt is given by (3). Assume also that the demand and inverse demand
functions faced by an individual ﬁrm in equilibrium, SD(·;µ) and P(·/S;µ),a r ed i ﬀerentiable.
1. Assumption A.1 holds if and only if equilibrium output q(c;µ)=SD(p(c;µ);µ) is decreasing in
µ;t h a ti s ,i fa n do n l yi fq(c;µ0) <q (c;µ) ∀c ∈ [0,c(µ)),µ 0 Â µ.
2. Assumption A.2 holds if and only if the equilibrium price p(c;µ)=P(q(c;µ)/S;µ) is decreasing
in µ;t h a ti s ,i fa n do n l yi fp(c;µ0) <p (c;µ) ∀c ∈ [0,c(µ0)),µ 0 Â µ.
Proof. The assertions can be shown by taking the derivative of the proﬁtd i ﬀerence and proﬁtr a t i o
with respect to c and applying the envelope theorem.
By deﬁnition, an increase in the distribution of active ﬁr m sc a u s e st h ep r o ﬁts of ﬁrms to fall. For
this to hold, the equilibrium price or quantity of any given ﬁrm must fall. If ﬁrm type c denotes
marginal costs, assumptions A.1 and A.2 say that both quantities and prices must fall in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 is of independent interest. Since its proof does not make use of the fact that µ summarizes
the distribution of active ﬁrms, it can be applied to any shift in consumers’ tastes or incomes which
reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Assumptions A.1 and A.2 (as well as the other conditions we impose on the reduced form proﬁt
function) are satisﬁed by a wide class of oligopoly models. Examples include the standard Cournot
model with homogenous products, and the linear demand model with a ﬁnite number of diﬀerentiated
products and either price or quantity competition; in Appendix A this is shown for the Cournot model.
As to models of monopolistic competition with a continuum of ﬁrms, the widely used Dixit-Stiglitz model
11Alternatively, we could assume the following. There exist functions h : M → R and b π :[ 0 ,1] × R → R+ such that
π(c;µ) ≡ b π(c;h(µ)) for all c ∈ [0,1] and µ ∈ M,w h e r eb π is strictly decreasing in its second argument. Hence, by deﬁnition,
h(µ0) ≥ h(µ) if and only if µ0 º µ.
12Formally, we endow M with the topology of weak* convergence.
13However, Boone (2000) — in independent work — provides a few parametric examples to show that an increase in the
toughness of competition results in an increase in the proﬁt ratio between a more and a less eﬃcient ﬁrm. This corresponds
to A.2.
6satisﬁes most of our assumptions, including A.1, but not A.2. In fact, in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, ﬁrms
use a simple markup pricing rule in which the markup is a function of some substitutability parameter
in the utility function, but not of the mass of active ﬁrms. In the following, we give two examples of
models of monopolistic competition that satisfy our assumptions.
Example 1 (The linear demand model with a continuum of ﬁrms.) There is a continuum of












where x(i) is the consumption of variety i,a n dH the consumption of the Hicksian composite commodity.14
The parameter σ ∈ (0,1), measures the substitutability between diﬀerent varieties. Suppose each active
ﬁrm in the industry produces a unique variety. Denote by p(i) and c(i) the price and marginal cost
of variety i, respectively, and by Y consumer income. Normalizing the price of the Hicksian compos-
ite commodity to 1, H = Y −
R n
0 p(i)x(i)di.R e - l a b e lﬁrms in increasing order of marginal costs, i.e.,
c(j) >c (i) ⇒ j>i .L e tm ∈ (0,n] denote the least eﬃcient producer with positive sales in equilibrium.











That is, proﬁti so ft h ef o r mSπ(c;µ)=Sa(c(µ) − c)2 if c<c(µ),a n dSπ(c;µ)=0otherwise. It is
straightforward to check that the equilibrium proﬁt function satisﬁes our assumptions.¤
Example 2 (The linear demand model with perceived qualities.) This example is similar to the
preceding one. All ﬁrms now have the same constant marginal cost, normalized to zero. The utility of


















where u(i) ≥ 1 , is the perceived quality of variety i.15 Utility is strictly increasing in quality u(i),
provided that x(i) > 0.R e - l a b e lﬁrms in decreasing order of quality, i.e., u(i) >u (j) ⇒ i<j .L e tm
again denote the marginal producer. Firm i’s equilibrium proﬁt under price (or quantity) competition












which is again of the form Sπ(c;µ)=Sa(c(µ)−c)2, using, for example, the transformation u =2−c.¤
3 Stationary Equilibrium
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis, where we conﬁne attention to a free entry stationary equi-
librium, in which ﬁrms’ strategies and the distribution of ﬁrms are stationary. We characterize the
14This is the continuum version of the quadratic utility function which goes back to Bowley (1924). The associated
demand system is widely used in oligopoly models; see Vives (1999).
15This is the continuum version of the utility function in Sutton (1997c).
7stationary equilibrium, and show existence and uniqueness. We defer the analysis of the comparative
dynamics properties, which lie at the heart of this paper, to the next section.
In a stationary equilibrium, the value of a type-c i n c u m b e n ta tt h es t a r to ft h ee x i ts t a g e ,V (c), can
be written as






V (c)=[ Sπ(c;µ) − φ]+δ
·





is the value conditional on staying in the market for one period and behaving optimally thereafter. (In
other words, V (c)i st h ev a l u eo fat y p e - c ﬁrm at the output stage.) The expression for the conditional
value consists of two terms: the ﬁrst term is the ﬁrm’s current net proﬁt Sπ(c;µ) − φ, the second
captures the expected continuation value — with probability α the ﬁrm will be of the same eﬃciency
in the next period, while with the remaining probability it obtains a new draw from the distribution
function G(·).
Let c∗ be deﬁned by
c∗ ≡
½
sup{c ∈ [0,1] | V (c) > 0} if V (1) = 0,
1i f V (1) > 0.
Our assumptions ensure that the value function V (c) is continuous on [0,1], and constant on [c(µ),1]. If
π(0;µ) > 0, then standard arguments from dynamic programming imply that V (c) is strictly decreasing
on [0,min{c∗,c(µ)}]. Hence, a ﬁrm’s equilibrium exit strategy takes the form of a simple threshold rule,
c∗, according to which the ﬁrm exits if and only if c>c ∗.L e tM denote the mass of entering ﬁrms in
each period. In a stationary equilibrium,
V (c∗) ≥ 0,
with V (c∗)=0 i f M>0. (5)




V (c)G(dc) −  . (6)
Free entry implies that
V e ≤ 0,
with V e =0 i f M>0. (7)
Suppose the stationary equilibrium exhibits simultaneous entry and exit, i.e., M>0a n dc∗ < 1. In
this case, V e =0 ,a n ds o
R 1
0 V (c)G(dc)=ε. This allows us to compute the conditional value function
in closed form as
V (c)=
½ Sπ(c;µ)−φ+δ(1−α) 
1−αδ if c ≤ c∗,
Sπ(c;µ) − φ + δ(1 − α)  if c ≥ c∗.
(8)
In stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit, the free entry condition V e = 0 becomes
Z c∗
0
[Sπ(c;µ) − φ + δ(1 − α) ]G(dc) − (1 − αδ)  =0 . (E)
Similarly, the condition for optimal exit, V (c∗) = 0, becomes
Sπ(c∗;µ) − φ + δ(1 − α)  =0 . (X)
8From exit condition (X), the current net proﬁt of the marginal incumbent ﬁrm, Sπ(c∗;µ)−φ, is negative.
This ﬁrm stays in the market only because there is a probability 1−α that it will get a new draw from
G(·), and the value of this option is δ(1−α) . In a stationary free entry equilibrium with simultaneous
entry and exit, the value of a new draw must be equal to the entry cost  . To simplify the exposition,
we henceforth assume that φ 6= δ(1−α) . Then, a necessary condition for a stationary equilibrium with
entry and exit is φ>δ (1 − α) , which implies that the current gross proﬁt of the marginal incumbent
ﬁrm must be strictly positive, i.e., c∗ < c(µ).
Let V
e







V (c)G(dc) −  . (9)











The entry condition (E’) says that the value of an entrant who uses the equilibrium policy c∗ in the
ﬁrst period, and behaves optimally thereafter, is equal to zero. The exit condition (X’) says that the
derivative of this value function of an entrant with respect to the exit policy (and evaluated at the
equilibrium exit policy c∗) is equal to zero. This close link between the entry and exit conditions is
a consequence of the assumed sequence of moves. Since incumbents and new entrants face the same
decision problem at the exit stage, the equilibrium exit policy of an incumbent, c∗, must maximize the
value of an entrant. Hence, at the equilibrium exit policy, both the value of a new entrant and the
derivative of the value function with respect to the exit policy have to be zero.
T h e s ep r o p e r t i e so ft h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nV
e
(x;µ) are straightforward to illustrate in Figure 1. Note
ﬁrst that V
e
(·;µ)i s( f o rφ 6= δ(1 − α) ) single-peaked on [0,1].16 Furthermore, V
e
is continuous, and
continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to its ﬁrst argument. Observe also that V
e
(0;µ)=− <0.
Hence, if µ gives the cost distribution in the stationary equilibrium, and c∗ the equilibrium exit policy,
then V
e
(·;µ) takes its unique maximum at b x(µ)=c∗. This implies that there can be at most one
stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit. Note ﬁnally that, for all x>0, V
e
(x;·)i s
decreasing in µ (provided c(µ) > 0).
The distribution of active ﬁr m si sd e t e r m i n e db yﬁrms’ entry and exit decisions. Let µ[c∗,M]d e n o t e
the invariant measure of ﬁrms’ eﬃciencies at stage 4 if all ﬁrms follow exit policy c∗ ∈ (0,1), and the
mass of entrants in each period is M. This measure is uniquely deﬁned by
µ[c∗,M]([0,z]) =
M
(1 − α)(1− G(c∗))
G(min{z,c∗}), ∀z ∈ [0,1]. (D)
The stationary distribution has thus the shape of G(·), is truncated at c∗, and scaled by the factor
M/[(1 − α)(1− G(c∗))]. The stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit can now be
deﬁned as the triplet (µ,M,c∗) satisfying equations (E), (X), and (D).
In a stationary equilibrium without entry and exit, we have M =0a n dc∗ = 1, and the stationary
distribution is given by
µλ([0,z]) = λG(z), ∀z ∈ [0,1], (10)
16Either V
e (·;µ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nx on [0,1], decreasing on [0,1], or there exists a unique b x(µ)s u c ht h a tV
e (·;µ)i s
increasing in x on [0, b x(µ)] and decreasing on [b x(µ),1]. In the non-generic case φ = δ(1 − α) , V
e(·;µ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nc
on [0,c(µ)] and constant on [c(µ),1].
9where λ>0 is a scaling parameter. The stationary equilibrium without entry and exit is summarized
by the triplet (µλ,0,1), satisfying (5), (7), and (10). Note that any stationary equilibrium distribution
must be an element of M∗ ≡ {µ ∈ M|∀z ∈ [0,1],µ([0,z]) = kG(min{z,c∗}),k > 0,c ∗ ∈ (0,1]}.
Before we turn to the issues of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, let us consider some features
of the equilibrium which are consistent with stylized facts on industry dynamics. The probability of
immediate exit of a new entrant is 1 − G(c∗), whereas an incumbent leaves the market with a smaller
probability, namely (1 − α)(1 − G(c∗)). Empirical studies have indeed shown that new ﬁrms are the
ones most likely to exit the market. Moreover, the model implies that new entrants are on average more
eﬃcient than exiting ﬁrms, but less eﬃcient than surviving incumbents. This is again consistent with
the empirical evidence. Finally, if ﬁrm size (e.g., measured by output) decreases with marginal cost c,
the simple stochastic process given by (1) implies that ﬁrm growth is negatively related to ﬁrm size,
as found by Evans (1987) and others. In Section 6, we re-consider the model and allow for a broader
class of Markov processes. This permits the model to be consistent with a number of other empirical
ﬁndings.
To simplify the proof of existence and uniqueness, we impose a technical condition on the reduced-
form proﬁt function π.
(FREE) Fix any positive measure µ ∈ M∗,l e tk>0 a scaling parameter, and denote by µ0 the
null measure, i.e., µ0(A) ≡ 0 for any Borel set A.T h e n ,
(i) limk→∞ π(c;kµ)=0for all c>0, and
(ii)
R 1
0 Sπ(c;µ0)G(dc) >φ+( 1− δ) .
Part (i) of the free entry assumption (FREE) ensures that unlimited entry drives proﬁts down to
zero, while part (ii) implies that any stationary equilibrium distribution must be positive. We are now
in a position to state our existence result.
Proposition 2 There always exists a stationary equilibrium. Moreover, if a stationary equilibrium with
simultaneous entry and exit exists, it is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
There are two kinds of stationary equilibria: (i) with simultaneous entry and exit, and (ii) without
simultaneous entry and exit. If the ﬁrst kind exists, it is the unique equilibrium. If it does not, there
exists an equilibrium in which a (positive) mass of ﬁrms is active, and no entry and exit take place.
Since in this case, the entry and exit conditions become inequalities (V e≤0a n dV (1)≥0, respectively),
t h em a s so fa c t i v eﬁrms in this equilibrium is not uniquely determined. In our proof of existence, we
proceed in two steps. First, we neglect condition (D) and ﬁnd the equilibrium exit policy c∗ by varying
the distribution of ﬁrms in M∗ until (E) and (X) are satisﬁed. (If such a c∗ does not exist in (0,1), then
the stationary equilibrium does not exhibit entry and exit.) Since V
e
(c;·) is strictly decreasing in µ
for c ∈ (0,1], conditions (E) and (X) also pin down the equivalence class of the stationary distribution.
Only then do we consider the stationary distribution generated by c∗ and M,a sg i v e nb y( D ) .F r o m
assumptions (DOM) and (CON), and condition (D), it then follows that there exists a unique mass M
of entrants such that the stationary distribution generated by M and the exit policy c∗ is equivalent
to the distribution determined in the ﬁrst part of the proof. Note that our (novel) method of proof is
applicable also to models of perfect competition where ﬁrms are price-takers.
It is straightforward to ﬁnd conditions under which the unique stationary equilibrium involves si-
multaneous entry and exit.
Proposition 3 If the entry cost   is suﬃciently small, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with
simultaneous entry and exit.
10Proof. See Appendix.
For a stationary equilibrium to exhibit no entry and exit, the value of the least eﬃcient incumbent
(of type c = 1), conditional on staying in the market for another period, has to be larger than or
equal to the value of an entrant: V (1) ≥ 0 ≥ V e. An incumbent of type c = 1 is less eﬃcient than a
potential entrant (whose eﬃciency is drawn from G(·)) — but (in contrast to the potential entrant) has
already sunk the entry cost ε. Clearly, for small entry costs, the eﬃciency diﬀerence will outweigh the
incumbent’s sunk cost advantage, and we must have V (1) <Ve.
In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on the case of suﬃciently small entry costs so that the
stationary equilibrium exhibits ﬁrm turnover.
4T h e E ﬀects of Market Size and Sunk Costs on Firm Turnover
In this section, we analyze the comparative dynamics properties of the stationary equilibrium. We
begin by deﬁning a measure of ﬁrm turnover and showing the close connection between ﬁrm turnover
and the age distribution of ﬁrms. Then, we analyze the eﬀect of changes in the level of the entry cost
  and the ﬁxed cost φ on the equilibrium level of ﬁrm turnover. Next, we turn to the main concern of
the paper, namely the relationship between market size S on the one hand, and ﬁrm turnover and the
age distribution of ﬁrms on the other. We also consider the relationship between market size and the
number of active ﬁrms.
Measuring ﬁrm turnover. A natural measure of (relative) ﬁrm turnover is the ratio between
the mass of new entrants and the total mass of active ﬁrms in each period. This suggests deﬁning the





where the denominator is the mass of active ﬁrms at stage 4, and the numerator is the mass of ﬁrms
that have entered at stage 1 of the same period.
Using (D), the turnover rate in the stationary equilibrium can be written as




That is, given persistence α, there is a monotonically decreasing relationship between the equilibrium
exit policy c∗ and the turnover rate θ. The monotonicity of the relationship between c∗ and θ not only
holds for the simple Markov process (1) considered here, but for a large class of Markov processes, as
we will show in Section 6.
Age distribution of ﬁrms. In a stationary equilibrium, ﬁrms’ exit policy shapes the age distribu-
tion of ﬁrms in a market. Let b θ denote the (average) probability of exit of incumbents. In stationary
equilibrium, b θ =( 1− α)[1 − G(c∗)] = G(c∗)θ.17 We introduce the convention that the age of a newly
entered ﬁrm (which is still active at the output stage) is one. Conditional on not leaving the market
in the period of entry, the probability that a ﬁrm will survive until it reaches age a is then equal to
(1 − b θ)a−1. Consequently, the share of active ﬁrms whose age is less than or equal to a is given by
A(a|c∗) ≡
Pa−1
t=0(1 − b θ)t
P∞
t=0(1 − b θ)t =1− (1 − b θ)a,
17The exit probability b θ is another natural measure of ﬁrm turnover. The main results of the paper are not sensitive to
the particular choice of turnover measure.
11which is strictly decreasing in c∗. Hence, a decrease in exit policy c∗ shifts the age distribution towards
younger ﬁrms in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. In Section 6, we show that this stochastic
dominance result holds much more generally for a large class of Markov processes.
Entry costs and ﬁrm turnover. Having deﬁned a measure of ﬁrm turnover, we can now analyze
the eﬀects of changes in the parameters of the model on the turnover rate. Let us begin by looking at
the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h el e v e lo fe n t r yc o s t s .
Proposition 4 An increase in the entry cost   l e a d st oa ni n c r e a s ei ne x i tp o l i c yc∗, and hence to a
lower turnover rate θ and a shift in the age distribution of ﬁrms towards older ﬁrms. Furthermore, it
causes the distribution of active ﬁrms, µ, and the mass of entrants per period, M,t od e c r e a s e .
Proof. Starting from a stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit, denoted by (µ0,M 0,c ∗
0),
we consider an increase in the entry cost from  0 to  1 >  0. Let us assume that there is still a positive
turnover rate in the new stationary equilibrium (µ1,M 1,c ∗
1), i.e., θ1 > 0. (The proposition holds trivially
if θ1 = 0.) From (8) and (9), it is easy to see that
V
e
(x;µ0; 1) < V
e
(x;µ0; 0) for all x ∈ [0,1],
abusing notation by inserting argument   into the value function V
e
,a sd e ﬁned by (9). Hence, for
condition (E) to hold in the new stationary equilibrium, we must have µ1 ≺ µ0.S i n c e µ1 ≺ µ0 and
 1 >  0,w em u s th a v ec∗
1 >c ∗
0 for condition (X) to hold:
Sπ(c∗
0;µ1) − φ + δ(1 − α) 1 >S π (c∗
0;µ0) − φ + δ(1 − α) 0
=0
= Sπ(c∗
1;µ1) − φ + δ(1 − α) 1.
From (11), we thus obtain θ1 <θ 0.T o s e e t h a t M1 <M 0,n o t i c et h a tµ1 ≺ µ0 and c∗
1 >c ∗
0,i n
conjunction with (DOM), imply that µ1 ([0,c ∗
0]) <µ 0 ([0,c ∗
0]). Using (D), the result follows.
The assertion of the proposition may be roughly explained as follows. Both the marginal incumbent
(with cost level c∗) and the new entrant have a value of zero in equilibrium. However, since incumbents
have already sunk the entry cost, the average entrant has to be more eﬃcient than the marginal incum-
bent. Clearly, this wedge in eﬃciency is increasing in the level of entry costs. That is, exit policy c∗
increases with  . This, in turn, implies, that the hazard rate of incumbents is negatively related to the
level of entry costs. A more formal explanation is the following. For any exit policy c∗ and distribution
µ, an increase in entry cost   reduces the value of an entrant; that is, the curve V
e
in Figure 1 shifts
downwards. For the entry condition (E) to hold in the new equilibrium, the distribution of active ﬁrms
must be smaller. This implies that the net proﬁt Sπ(c;µ) − φ of any type c goes up. This eﬀect is
reinforced by the fact that the option value of staying in the market rises with the level of entry cost.
Hence, the value of the marginal incumbent in the initial equilibrium is now positive. Consequently,
the marginal incumbent is less eﬃcient in the new equilibrium. Hopenhayn (1992) derived the same
prediction in a model with price-taking ﬁrms. A corollary of our result is that, in markets with higher
entry costs, ﬁrms are on average less eﬃcient, while the induced intensity of price competition is lower
(in that the induced measure µ is smaller in the sense of our ordering on measures).
Fixed costs and ﬁrm turnover. Next, we analyze the eﬀect of a change in φ,w h i c hm a yb e
interpreted as a ﬁxed production cost or as an opportunity cost. The following proposition summarizes
our results.
Proposition 5 Suppose assumption A.1 holds. Then, an increase in the ﬁxed (or opportunity) cost
φ leads to a decrease in exit policy c∗, and hence to a higher turnover rate θ and a shift in the age
distribution towards younger ﬁrms. Furthermore, it causes the distribution of active ﬁrms, µ,a n dt h e
total mass of active ﬁrms, µ([0,1]),t od e c r e a s e .
12Proof. Starting from a stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit, denoted by (µ0,M 0,c ∗
0),
we consider an increase in φ from φ0 to φ1, φ1 >φ 0. Assume that there is still a positive turnover rate
in the new stationary equilibrium (µ1,M 1,c ∗










(0;µ0;φ0). This implies that we must have µ1 ≺ µ0 for (E) to hold again in the
new stationary equilibrium. We now claim that c∗
1 <c ∗
0. To see this, suppose otherwise that c∗
1 ≥ c∗
0.
A c c o r d i n gt oc o n d i t i o n( X ) ,
Sπ(c∗
1;µ1) − φ1 + δ(1 − α)  =0=Sπ(c∗
0;µ0) − φ0 + δ(1 − α) ,
which implies that Sπ(c∗
0;µ1) − φ1 ≥ Sπ(c∗
0;µ0) − φ0. Assumption A.1 then ensures that















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that V
e
(·;µ1;φ1) assumes a maximum at c∗
1,a n dt h e
second inequality from (12). Now, V
e
(c∗
1;µ1;φ1) > 0 cannot hold as it is in contradiction with (E).
That is, we must have c∗
1 <c ∗
0. Finally, notice that, from (11), the turnover rate decreases monotonically
with c∗,h o l d i n gα ﬁxed. Let us now show that we must indeed have θ1 > 0 (as assumed above), given








1;φ1) = 0, respectively. (In the proof of
Proposition 2, we have already shown that such measures exist.) It is easy to see that φ1 >φ 0 implies
µ0
1 ≺ µ0
0.S i n c eθ0 > 0 by assumption, we have V
e
(c∗;µ0
0;φ0)=0f o rs o m ec∗ ∈ (0,1). From assumption
A.1, µ0
1 ≺ µ0






0;φ0) for all c∗ ∈ (0,1). This concludes
the proof of the assertion on turnover. The result on the total mass of active ﬁrms follows immediately
from µ1 ≺ µ0 and c∗
1 <c ∗
0 (and (DOM)).
Holding ﬁxed the distribution of active ﬁrms, an increase in the ﬁxed cost φ shifts the curve V
e
d o w n w a r d s( s e eF i g u r e1 ) :f o ra n ye x i tp o l i c y ,t h ev a l ue of an entrant decreases. Since the equilibrium
value of an entrant is zero, this implies that, in the new equilibrium, the measure of active ﬁrms µ is
smaller (in terms of our ordering on measures). Hence, there are two opposing eﬀe c t so na ni n c u m b e n t ’ s
net proﬁt Sπ(c;µ)−φ. On the one hand, the increase in ﬁxed cost φ reduces the net proﬁto fa l lt y p e s
by the same amount. On the other hand, the endogenous decrease in µ reduces the intensity of price
competition. All ﬁrms beneﬁt from the higher equilibrium prices, but (A.1 ensures that) less eﬃcient
ﬁrms gain less in absolute terms (as they produce a smaller quantity). For the entry condition (E) to
continue to hold, the overall eﬀect on proﬁtm u s tb ep o s i t i v ef o rt h em o s te ﬃcient ﬁrms, and negative
for the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms. In particular, the increase in ﬁxed cost must decrease the proﬁto f
the marginal incumbent in the initial equilibrium. Hence, the exit policy c∗ decreases with φ,w h i c h
implies the predicted negative relationship between the ﬁxed cost φ and turnover rate θ.N o t et h a t ,i n
markets with higher ﬁxed costs, the distribution of ﬁrm types is shifted towards more eﬃcient ﬁrms,
while the induced intensity of price competition is lower (in that µ is smaller in the sense of our ordering
on measures). That is, if one were to correlate observable price-cost margins with the average eﬃciency
level, one would ﬁnd a positive cross-sectional correlation (assuming markets only diﬀered in their level
of ﬁxed costs).
Market size and ﬁrm turnover. We now turn to our major concern, namely the relationship
between market size and ﬁrm turnover. The central prediction of this paper is summarized in the
following proposition.
13Proposition 6 Suppose assumption A.2 holds. Then, an increase in market size S leads to a decrease
in exit policy c∗, and hence to a rise in the turnover rate θ and a shift in the age distribution of ﬁrms
towards younger ﬁrms. Furthermore, an increase in market size causes the distribution of active ﬁrms,
µ, and the mass of entrants per period, M,t or i s e .
Proof. Starting from a stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit, denoted by (µ0,M 0,c ∗
0),
we consider an increase in the size of the market from S0 to S1 >S 0. Let us assume that there is still a
positive turnover rate in the new stationary equilibrium (µ1,M 1,c ∗
1), i.e., θ1 > 0. (It is straightforward
to show that turnover must indeed be positive in the new equilibrium, given that θ0 > 0. The argument
is similar to that in the proof of Proposition 5, replacing assumption A.1 by A.2.) The proof proceeds










(0;µ0;S0). For entry condition (E) to hold in the new equilibrium, we thus need
µ1 Â µ0. Second, suppose there exists a y ∈ (0,c(µ1)) such that S1π(y;µ1)=S0π(y;µ0). Assumption
A.2 then implies that S1π(c;µ1) >S 0π(c;µ0) for all c ∈ [0,y), and the reverse inequality for all








where the equality follows from condition (X). From A.2 we then obtain















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that V
e
(·;µ1;S1) is maximized at c∗
1,a n dt h es e c o n d
inequality from (13). Thus, entry condition (E) cannot hold in the new equilibrium: a contradiction.
Consequently, we must have c∗
1 <c ∗
0, and hence θ1 >θ 0.O b s e r v et h a ty e x i s t sa n di si n( 0 ,c ∗
0); otherwise
(E) would be violated. Finally, let us consider the eﬀect of the increase in market size on the mass of ﬁrms
that enter each period. Since µ1 Â µ0 and c∗
1 <c ∗
0,w eo b t a i n( u s i n g( D O M ) )µ1 ([0,c ∗
1]) >µ 0 ([0,c ∗
1]),
and hence, using (D), M1 >M 0.
The result may be explained as follows. In a free entry equilibrium, the measure of active ﬁrms, µ,
is positively related to market size. Holding the distribution of active ﬁrms ﬁxed, an increase in market
size raises the value of ﬁrms for any exit policy. Graphically, this means that the curve V
e
in Figure 1
shifts upwards. Free entry then implies that the measure of ﬁrms has to increase with market size. This
shifts the curve V
e
downwards. Hence, there are two opposing eﬀects on a ﬁrm’s gross proﬁt Sπ(c;µ).
On the one hand, the rise in market size S increases the proﬁts of all ﬁrms proportionally. This can be
thought of as an increase in output levels, holding prices ﬁxed. On the other hand, as the distribution
of ﬁrms increases, prices (and, hence, price-cost margins) fall. A.2 implies that the percentage decrease
in proﬁt from an increase in µ is greater the less eﬃcient is the ﬁrm. Hence, if there is some type for
which its value remains unchanged, then the value of all better types increases, and that of all worse
types decreases. Since the equilibrium value of an entrant is zero, independently of market size, there
must be some types in [0,c ∗], which are worse oﬀ in the larger market. In particular, the marginal
14incumbent in the smaller market would have a negative value in the larger market if it were forced to
use the same exit policy as in the smaller market. This implies that the marginal surviving ﬁrm has to
be more eﬃcient in larger markets. That is, exit policy c∗ is decreasing with market size. The hazard
rate of the average incumbent ﬁrm is therefore higher in larger markets: ﬁrm turnover and market size
are positively correlated. An immediate consequence is that the age distribution of ﬁrms in a smaller
market ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that in a larger market. Moreover, in larger markets, the
distribution of ﬁrm types is shifted towards more eﬃcient ﬁrms, while the induced intensity of price
competition is higher (in that µ is greater in the sense of our ordering on measures). That is, if one were
to correlate observable price-cost margins with the average eﬃciency level of active ﬁrms, one would
ﬁnd a negative cross-sectional correlation (assuming markets only diﬀered in their size).
It is important to point out that our prediction on market size and ﬁrm turnover (Proposition 6)
would not obtain in a model of perfect competition (as in Hopenhayn (1992)) or in a Dixit-Stiglitz
type model of monopolistic competition (as in Melitz (1999)). The reason is that, in these models, the
price competition eﬀect is absent, which implies that equilibrium price-cost margins are independent of
market size.
Let us illustrate this in a model of a homogenous goods industry with price-taking ﬁrms. In such
a model, the gross proﬁto fat y p e - c ﬁrm may be written as π(c;p), where p is the equilibrium price.
Market size enters the proﬁt function only indirectly through p.T h e v a l u e o f a t y p e - c incumbent at
stage 4 may then be denoted by V (c;p). Under weak assumptions, V (c;p)i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi np
for all c ∈ [0,c ∗], where c∗ is the optimal exit policy, given price p.F u r t h e r m o r e , V (c;p) > 0 for all
c ∈ [0,c ∗), and V (c;p) = 0 for all c ∈ [c∗,1]. The entry condition for a stationary equilibrium is given
by Z 1
0
V (c;p)G(dc) −   =0 .
Hence, the entry condition uniquely determines the equilibrium price p, which is independent of market
size. Given p, the exit threshold is uniquely determined by the exit condition V (c∗;p) = 0. Consequently,
in a model of perfect competition, exit policy and turnover rate do not vary with market size.
The reasoning in the proof of Proposition 6 shows that eﬃcient ﬁrms make higher proﬁts in larger
markets, and hence are more valuable. In contrast, less eﬃcient ﬁrms are better oﬀ in smaller markets.
That is, the distribution of proﬁts and ﬁrm values is more “dispersed” in larger markets, while the
distribution of eﬃciency levels is less “dispersed”. The eﬀect on proﬁts is illustrated graphically in
Figure 2.
Corollary 1 The range of proﬁts and ﬁrm values across active ﬁrms in the same market is increasing
with market size. Formally, ∆π(S) ≡ Sπ(0;µ) − Sπ(c∗;µ) and ∆V (S) ≡ V (0) − V (c∗) are increasing
with S.
Proof. Exit condition (X) implies that Sπ(c∗;µ)=φ − δ(1 − α) , and hence ∆π(S1) − ∆π(S0)=
S1π(0;µ1) − S0π(0;µ0), using the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 6. For S1 >S 0 (and,
therefore, µ1 Â µ0), the last expression is strictly positive since y>0. Similarly, V (c∗) = 0, and hence
∆V (S)=V (0). Using (8) and y>0, one obtains the result.
Market size and the number of active ﬁrms: the price competition eﬀect. Our result
on market size and ﬁrm turnover is closely related to the price competition eﬀect (Sutton (1997a)) in
standard models of oligopolistic competition: equilibrium prices fall with an increase in the number
of ﬁrms (as formally stated in our assumption A.2). In the Cournot model with homogenous goods
and identical ﬁrms, the price competition eﬀect implies that, in a free entry equilibrium, the number of
active ﬁrms rises less than proportionally with market size (see, e.g., Campbell and Hopenhayn (1999)).
This is, in fact, what Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) ﬁnd in their seminal paper. Assuming that ﬁrms
within a market are identical, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) use the relation between the number of ﬁrms
15and market size to back out parameters in a reduced form proﬁt function. Examining the extent to
which the market size per ﬁrm increases in the number of ﬁrms, they are able to infer how competition
changes with the number of ﬁrms. Later studies (e.g., Asplund and Sandin (1999) and Campbell and
Hopenhayn (2002)) have conﬁrmed Bresnahan and Reiss’ initial ﬁnding that an increase in market size
leads to a less-than-proportionate increase in the number of active ﬁrms.
In our model, however, ﬁrms are heterogeneous, and the endogenous distribution of eﬃciencies
depends on characteristics such as market size. Moreover, ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated goods. Does the
price competition eﬀect still imply that the number of ﬁrms rises less-than-proportionately with market
size? The answer is that it does not necessarily. This is for two reasons.
1. Diﬀerentiated products. If ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated goods and consumers have a preference
for variety, then a market expansion eﬀect may counteract the price competition eﬀect. In larger
markets, consumers may spend a larger fraction of their income on the products in the diﬀeren-
tiated goods industry as free entry of ﬁrms ensures that more variety is oﬀered than in smaller
markets. In fact, in the linear demand model (Example 1), the market expansion eﬀect outweighs
the price competition eﬀect in small markets: even if all ﬁrms have the same marginal cost, the
ratio between the mass of ﬁrms and market size, µ([0,1])/S, rises (decreases) with market size,
provided market size is suﬃciently small (large).
2. Eﬃciency diﬀerences. If ﬁrms diﬀer in their marginal costs, then the fractional decrease in gross
proﬁts from an endogenouse rise in the intensity of competition in larger markets is smaller for more
eﬃcient ﬁrms (as stated in A.2). Consider now the thought experiment of scaling up market size
and the population of active ﬁrms by the same factor. This will decrease the proﬁto fs u ﬃciently
ineﬃcient ﬁrms but increase the proﬁto fs u ﬃciently eﬃcient ﬁrms. Moreover, even if such a
replication of the population of consumers and ﬁrms reduces the proﬁt of the average entrant,
the expected proﬁt of an entrant may still rise since the proﬁto faﬁrm is strictly convex in its
marginal cost.18
In numerical simulations using the linear demand model, we found indeed that the ratio between the
number of ﬁrms and market size, µ([0,1])/S,i sﬁrst increasing and then decreasing with market size.
Cost persistence and ﬁrm turnover. What is the eﬀect of changes in the persistence of costs,
as measured by parameter α, on the turnover rate? In the ﬁrst discussion paper version of this paper
(Asplund and Nocke (2000)), we show that an increase in α has two opposing eﬀects on the turnover
rate θ:t h eﬁrst term in (11), (1 − α), clearly decreases with α, but the second term, [1 − G(c∗)]/G(c∗),
is positively correlated with α. (The intuition for the latter observation is the following. The marginal
incumbent makes a negative net proﬁt, Sπ(c∗;µ) − φ<0, and is only in the market because of the
prospect of lower costs in the future (“option value”). An increase in the persistence of costs decreases
the value of this option, and so the marginal incumbent has to be more eﬃcient.) The overall eﬀect on
θ is ambiguous.19
For empirical work, this has important implications. In a cross-industry study of ﬁrm turnover, it
is likely to be diﬃcult to control for diﬀerences in the stochastic process governing the evolution of
ﬁrms’ eﬃciencies or consumers’ tastes (such as the persistence parameter α). To minimize measurement
problems in this dimension, in Section 7, we analyze turnover rates across independent local markets
w i t h i nt h es a m ei n d u s t r y .
18For a given output level, the proﬁto faﬁrm is linear in its (constant) marginal cost. However, since ﬁrms with lower
marginal costs will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce at a greater scale, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is strictly convex in its marginal cost.
19However, an increase in α has an unambigously negative eﬀect on the exit probability b θ (which does not keep track
of those entrants that leave immediately after learning their current type).
165 Growing and Declining Markets
Intuitively, one may expect entry rates to be high in periods of market growth and low in periods of
decline. Conversely, exit rates would be low when markets are growing and high when markets are
shrinking. This intuition is not correct. The aim of this section is to analyze entry and exit rates
when market size changes over time. In nonstationary markets, entry and exit rates will, in general,
be diﬀerent. Hence, our previous analysis of stationary markets does not carry over. We now show
that, even in nonstationary markets, both entry and exit rates tend to be positively correlated with the
level of market size. Holding (current) market size ﬁxed, however, entry rates will tend to be higher in
growing than in declining markets.
The exogenous evolution of market size is summarized by the deterministic sequence {St},w h i c h
is common knowledge to all ﬁrms. All other exogenous variables remain constant over time. To make
the analysis more tractable, we assume throughout in this section that changes in market size and
entry costs are suﬃciently small so that there is simultaneous entry and exit in each period along the
equilibrium path. Moreover, we simplify the analysis further by assuming α =0 ;t h a ti s ,i ne a c hp e r i o d ,
all incumbents get a new draw from distribution G(·).
The value function of an incumbent at the period-t exit stage is given by
Vt(c)=m a x
(







where µt is the measure of active ﬁrms at the period-t output stage, and c∗
t+1 the exit policy in t +1 .





Vt(c)G(dc) −  .
Since we assume entry costs and the changes in market size to be small, there is simultaneous entry
and exit in each period, i.e., c∗
t < 1a n dMt > 0 for all t. Consequently, the value of an entrant and the
value of the marginal incumbent are always zero: V e
t =0a n dVt(c∗
t) = 0 for all t.T h ee n t r ya n de x i t





[Stπ(c;µt) − φ + δ ]G(dc) −   =0 , (Et)
and
Stπ (c∗
t;µt) − φ + δ  =0 , (Xt)
respectively. Given that all ﬁrms follow exit policy {c∗
t} and the mass of new entrants is given by {Mt},
we obtain the following relationship between the distribution of active ﬁrms in period t and the total
mass of active ﬁrms in t − 1:
µt ([0,z]) = [Mt + µt−1 ([0,1])]G(min{z,c∗
t}),∀z ∈ [0,1]. (Dt)
The term in brackets gives the total mass of ﬁrms at the beginning of the period-t exit stage: the sum
of the mass of new entrants, Mt, and the mass of incumbents, µt−1([0,1]). Each of these ﬁr m sg e t sa
draw from distribution function G(·), and thus stays in the market with probability G(c∗
t). As before,
the equilibrium measure µt is an element of M∗. Given the mass of initially active ﬁrms, equilibrium is
described by the sequence {µt,M t,c ∗
t} satisfying equations (Et), (Xt), and (Dt) for all t.
Note that the future enters conditions (Et)a n d( X t) only through the option value of staying in
the market, which is constant over time and given by δ , provided (as assumed) that there is positive
17gross entry in all future periods. In contrast, the future does not directly enter condition (Dt). The
only way the past enters the equilibrium conditions is in (Dt) through the total mass of ﬁrms active in
the previous period. As a result, the dynamic entry and exit conditions, (Et)a n d( X t), are equal to
the static ones, (E) and (X), except for the fact that α =0 ,a n dS and µ are indexed by t.N o w ,f r o m
our previous analysis (proof of Proposition 2), we know that the entry and exit conditions uniquely
determine the equilibrium exit policy and the “equivalence class” of the stationary distribution. That
is, c∗
t and the equivalence class of µt are uniquely deﬁned by (Et)a n d( X t). In particular, they are
independent of future and past values of market size. Applying Proposition 6, we obtain that the
exit policy c∗
t is decreasing in current market size St.A c c o r d i n gt o( D t), the stationary distribution in
period t is given by the distribution function G(·), truncated at c∗
t,a n ds c a l e db yMt + µt−1 ([0,1]).
Consequently, conditions (Et)a n d( X t) also pin down the scaling factor, and hence the total mass of
active ﬁrms, µt ([0,1]). Thus, condition (Dt) uniquely determines the mass of new entrants, Mt,a sa
function of µt−1 ([0,1]) and St.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, since (Et)a n d( X t)p i nd o w nMt + µt−1 ([0,1]), any
change in the mass of last period’s active ﬁrms will be exactly oﬀset by a change in this period’s mass
of entrants (again, provided there is some entry and exit in all periods).
We deﬁne the entry rate to be “forward looking”, and the exit rate to be “backward looking”. The






The period-t exit rate, χt,i st h es h a r eo fﬁrms active in period t − 1, which leave the market in period







We are now in the position to state our two main results on ﬁrm turnover when market size changes
over time. First, we consider a given sequence {St}, and analyze the eﬀe c to fc h a n g i n gm a r k e ts i z ei na
single period. Then, we analyze the co-movements between {St}, {ηt},a n d{χt}.
Proposition 7 Consider two sequences of market size, {St} and {S0
t},w h e r eSr <S 0
r,a n dSt = S0
t for
all t 6= r. Then, the resulting equilibrium sequences of entry rates are such that ηt = η0
t for all t<r
and t>r+1, ηr <η 0
r,a n dηr+1 >η 0
r+1 if and only if µr ([0,1]) <µ 0
r ([0,1]). Equilibrium exit rates are
characterized by χt = χ0
t for all t 6= r,a n dχr <χ 0
r.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 2 Consider an arbitrary sequence of market size, {St}. In equilibrium, exit rates are posi-
tively correlated with current market size. More precisely, χt is increasing in St,a n di n d e p e n d e n to fSr,
r 6= t. Equilibrium entry rates are positively related to current market size, too, but only if controlling
for last period’s market size: holding St−1 ﬁxed, entry rate ηt is increasing in St,a n di n d e p e n d e n to f
Sr, r 6= t,t − 1.M o r e o v e r ,h o l d i n gSt ﬁxed, ηt is negatively correlated with the mass of active ﬁrms in
t − 1.
From the dynamic entry and exit conditions, (Et)a n d( X t), the exit policy c∗
t and the mass of active
ﬁrms, µt([0,1]), is a function of current market size St, and independent of past and future market size.
20Again, we could use b ηt ≡ G(c∗)ηt as an alternative measure, which does not keep track of those entrants that exit
immediately after learning their current eﬃciency.
18From our analysis of stationary markets, we then know that c∗
t is decreasing in St.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h e
exit rate xt is increasing in St. From our previous analysis, we also know that the measure of currently
active types µt is increasing in St (in terms of our ordering on measures). Given that the mass of
incumbents, µt−1([0,1]), is independent of St, it follows that the mass of new entrants, Mt,m u s tb e
positively related to St. Furthermore, since ﬁrms use a tougher exit policy in larger markets, an increase
in current market size must cause Mt to rise by a larger fraction than the total mass of active ﬁrms,
µt([0,1]) = [Mt + µt−1([0,1])]G(c∗
t). That is, the entry rate ηt must increase with St, holding St−1 (and
hence µt−1([0,1])) ﬁxed.
Note the asymmetry between entry rates in growing and declining markets. If market size and the
mass of active ﬁrms (i.e., St and µt([0,1])) are positively correlated, as one would intuitively expect,
then entry rates will be higher in growing than in declining markets, holding ﬁxed the level of market
size: given St, ηt is then negatively correlated with St−1.
Let us point out that the predictions of Proposition 7 and Corollary 2 would remain unchanged if we
assumed that market size followed some stochastic process, and the realization of current market size
became common knowledge at the start of each period (prior to entry decisions). The results of this
section provide us with a useful benchmark. The caveat to keep in mind, however, is that they have
been obtained under the rather strong assumption that incumbents’ cost draws are i.i.d., i.e., α =0 .A
more general treatment of growing and declining markets is left for future research.
6 Robustness of Results
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results along two dimensions, namely the sequence
of moves and the evolution of ﬁrms’ eﬃciencies. So far, we have assumed that exit decisions take
place after incumbents and entrants learn their current type. This gave rise to a simple mathematical
structure. Moreover, it captured the observation that, in many markets, a subset of new entrants make
initial investments but never reach the production stage and, hence, exit again. The obvious question is
whether our results are sensitive to the sequence of moves. The timing we want to analyze here is as in
Hopenhayn’s (1992) model. At the ﬁrst stage, entry and exit decisions take place. At the second stage,
the new entrants and surviving incumbents learn their current type. Finally, the active ﬁrms play a
market game and receive proﬁts.
In the main part of this paper, we assumed that the evolution of an incumbent’s eﬃciency is governed
by equation (1). This stochastic process allowed us to obtain simple closed-form solutions for ﬁrms’
value functions and the stationary distribution, expressed only in terms of the exit policy c∗ and the
mass of entrants M. We now want to show that the main results of this paper hold more generally
for a larger class of Markov processes. This is of particular interest since the simple stochastic process
considered so far cannot account for some of the stylized facts regarding the relationship between ﬁrm
size and ﬁrm age on the one hand, and ﬁrm growth and survival on the other. For instance, assuming
that a ﬁrm’s output q(c;µ,S) is decreasing in marginal cost c, equation (1) implies that the probability
of exit, (1−α)(1−G(c∗)), is independent of an incumbent’s size. This is inconsistent with the empirical
ﬁnding that ﬁrm size and failure are negatively correlated (e.g., Evans (1987), Hall (1987), and Dunne,
Roberts and Samuelson (1989)). With the class of Markov processes considered here, this and other
stylized facts are implied by or consistent with our model.
For brevity of exposition, we change both the timing and the stochastic process in our model, rather
than discussing each modiﬁcation in turn. Incorporating the new Markov process into the model of
Section 2 proceeds in a very similar fashion.
Consider an incumbent of type c. The probability that, in the next period, his marginal cost is less
than or equal to c0 is given by F(c0|c). For any c0 ∈ (0,1 ) ,w ea s s u m et h a tF(c0|c) is strictly decreasing in
c. This means that a currently eﬃcient ﬁrm is more likely to be eﬃcient tomorrow than a currently less
19eﬃcient ﬁrm; this is formally expressed in terms of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Suppose that ﬁrm
size is measured by output q(c;µ,S), which is decreasing in c, and suppose that suﬃciently ineﬃcient
ﬁrms exit the market, c∗ < 1. Then, the probability of survival is increasing with ﬁrm size, which is
consistent with the empirical evidence. For convenience, we assume that F(·|c) is strictly increasing
on [0,1], and F(c0|c) is continuous in c0 and c. Moreover, we posit that the distribution of entrants’
eﬃciencies is given by the distribution of a particular type of incumbent. That is, there exists a cost
level b c ∈ (0,1) such that G(·) ≡ F(·|b c). For some results, we impose a further technical condition, which
will be discussed below.
At the entry and exit stage (the new stage 1), the value of an incumbent with previous cost level c
can be written as





where V (c;µ,S) is the value of the incumbent conditional on staying in the market in the current period





where W(c0;µ,S) ≡ Sπ(c0;µ)−φ+δV(c0;µ,S)i st h ev a l u eo faﬁrm after learning that its new type is




W(c;µ,S)G(dc) −  
= V (b c;µ,S) −  .
Standard arguments in dynamic programming imply that the conditional value V (c;µ,S) is strictly
decreasing in marginal cost c, provided the conditional value of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm is positive,
V (0;µ,S) > 0. Furthermore, under the same condition, V (c;µ,S) is strictly decreasing in the measure
µ and strictly increasing in market size S.
In a stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit, where c∗ < 1,
V e(µ,S)=0 ( E R)
and
V (c∗;µ,S)=0 . (XR)
Consequently, if c∗ < 1, the “average entrant” b c is more eﬃcient than the marginal incumbent c∗: b c<c ∗.
Exit policy c∗ and the mass of entrants per period, M, induce a unique stationary distribution. The




F(z|c)µ(dc), ∀z ∈ [0,1]. (DR)
A stationary equilibrium is a triplet {µ,M,c∗} satisfying equations (ER), (XR), and (DR). Proving
existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium is beyond the scope of this section. Instead, we
focus on the main comparative dynamics results.
The turnover rate is deﬁned by θ ≡ M/µ([0,1]). In a stationary equilibrium, we can interpret the
total mass of ﬁrms active at the output stage in period t as being the survivors amongst the ﬁrms that
entered in periods t, t − 1, t − 2, t − 3, and so on. Decomposing the mass of active ﬁrms into diﬀerent





















Since dσs(c∗)/dc∗ > 0, the equilibrium turnover rate θ =1 /[1 +
P∞
s=1 σs(c∗)] is strictly decreasing with
exit policy c∗. Very generally, there is a close relationship between the exit policy c∗ (which acts as an
absorbing barrier for the Markov process governing a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency) and the probability distribution
of a ﬁrm’s age at the time of exit: the probability that a ﬁr me x i t sl e s st h a no re q u a lt os periods after
entry is given by 1 − σs(c∗). Hence, an increase in c∗ shifts the probability distribution of a ﬁrm’s age
at exit towards later exit (in terms of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance) and raises the expected life time
of a new entrant, 1/θ =1+
P∞
s=1 σs(c∗).
What is the eﬀect of a change in the exit policy c∗ on the (stationary) age distribution of ﬁrms at
a given point in time? Let A(·|c∗) denote the cumulative age distribution function, given that all ﬁrms









For A(a|c∗) to be decreasing in c∗ for all a, we need to impose a regularity condition on the Markov
process.
Proposition 8 Suppose F and G are such that the probability that a ﬁrm exits t ≥ 1 periods after
entry, conditional on having survived for t − 1 periods, is decreasing in the exit policy c∗.T h a ti s ,l e t
the hazard rate (σt−1(c∗) − σt(c∗))/σt−1(c∗) be decreasing in c∗. Then, an increase in exit policy c∗
shifts the (stationary) age distribution of ﬁrms towards older ﬁrms in terms of ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance. Formally, A(a|c∗) is decreasing in c∗ for all a ≥ 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
We are now in the position to analyze the eﬀects of sunk costs and market size on market turbulence.
Throughout, we assume that there is simultaneous entry and exit in the initial stationary equilibrium.
First, we consider an increase in entry costs from  0 to  1. Holding the distribution of active ﬁrms ﬁxed
at µ0, this reduces the value of a new entrant:
V (b c;µ0,S) −  1 < V (b c;µ0,S) −  0 =0 .
For the entry condition (ER) to hold in the new equilibrium, the distribution of active ﬁrms must
decrease, i.e., µ1 ≺ µ0. This raises the conditional value of any ﬁrm. In particular, the conditional value
of the marginal incumbent in the initial equilibrium is now positive:
V (c∗
0;µ1,S) > V (c∗
0;µ0,S)=0 .
The exit condition (XR) then implies that the marginal incumbent is less eﬃcient in the new equilibrium:
c∗
1 >c ∗
0. Hence, the rise in entry costs causes the equilibrium turnover rate θ to decrease, as predicted
by Proposition 4.
Next, we consider the eﬀect of an increase in market size from S0 to S1 >S 0. As before, we assume
A.2. In addition, we impose a technical condition on the Markov process. Speciﬁcally, the conditional
(cumulative) distribution function F(c0|c) can be decomposed as a weighted average of two distribution
functions:
F(c0|c)=a(c)F(c0)+[ 1− a(c)]F(c0), (14)
21where the weight a(c) ∈ (0,1), is continuous and strictly decreasing in c. The (continuous) distribution
functions F(·)a n dF(·)h a v es u p p o r t[ 0 ,ϕ]a n d[ ϕ,1], respectively, where ϕ ∈ (0,1). That is, F(·)g i v e s
the distribution of “good types”, and F(·) the distribution of “bad types”. The more eﬃcient the ﬁrm
is currently, the more “likely” it is to get a draw from the good distribution in the future: F(c0|c)i s
decreasing in c. We assume that ϕ is not too large so that ϕ<c(µ0).
For a given distribution of active ﬁrms, the increase in market size raises the value of a new entrant:
V e(µ0,S 1) >Ve(µ0,S 0)=0 .
Hence, the distribution of active ﬁrms is increasing with market size; that is, µ1 Â µ0. Assumption A.2
implies that there exists a type y ∈ (0,c ∗
0) such that all better types have higher current proﬁts in the
larger market, while all worse types have lower proﬁts (provided they make proﬁts at all in the smaller













It should be clear that the two inequalities cannot point the same way: if they did, the conditional value
of all types would rise (fall) with market size, which is inconsistent with the entry condition (ER). Since




















That is, conditional on obtaining a draw from the good distribution, the conditional value of a ﬁrm
is larger in the larger market, while the opposite relationship holds conditional on getting a draw from
the bad distribution. For an entrant, these two eﬀects cancel each other out in expectation. Now,
the marginal incumbent ﬁrm in the smaller market, c∗
0,i sl e s se ﬃcient than the average entrant b c,a n d
hence obtains a bad draw with a larger probability. This implies that the conditional value of type c∗
0
is negative in the larger market, i.e., V (c∗
0;µ1,S 1) < 0. It follows that c∗
1 <c ∗
0.T h e e ﬃciency of the
marginal incumbent rises with market size. This implies the positive relationship between market size
and ﬁrm turnover predicted by Proposition 6.
It is important to point out that we can dispense with condition (14) and still obtain our result on
market size and ﬁrm turnover (and the age distribution), provided we assume that the discount factor
is not too large. If δ is small, then single-crossing of the proﬁt function implies single-crossing of the
value function. Hence, in a larger and endogenously more competitive market, the value function will
cross the value function in the smaller market only once, and ﬁrms will use a tougher exit policy.
The analysis of the eﬀect of a change in the ﬁxed cost φ proceeds analogously to that of a change
in market size. It is omitted for brevity. The results of this section should be reassuring. The main
predictions of this paper are quite robust to changes in the sequence of moves and the stochastic process
governing the evolution of incumbents’ eﬃciencies.
227 Empirical Application: Hair Salons in Sweden
We now turn to the empirical application of our theory. As stressed in the Introduction, we have
focused on the comparative dynamics properties of our model with respect to “observables” such as
entry costs, ﬁxed costs, and market size. However, one important variable in our model, namely the
magnitude of the underlying idiosyncratic shocks (as captured by the persistence parameter α in our
benchmark formulation) is hard to measure or to control for, and is likely to vary across industries. In
addition, there are likely to be other factors that contribute to cross-industry diﬀerences in entry and
exit patterns (e.g., ﬁnancial constraints, regulations, industry life-cycles) and that are left out of our
model. Our empirical application is therefore based on data from a single sector where competition takes
place in many geographical markets: hair salons in Sweden. Thus, we use variations in local market
conditions, in particular market size and ﬁxed costs, to explain diﬀerences in entry and exit rates. An
identifying assumption of this approach, discussed further below, is that other factors remain constant
across geographical markets. In the context of studying diﬀerences in turnover rates, we believe this
assumption to be much more reasonable within an industry rather than across industries.
Competition among hair salons corresponds closely to the assumptions of our model. Even in small
towns, there is typically a large number of hair salons to choose from.21 Products are clearly diﬀeren-
tiated in terms of location and quality of service (which is closely tied to the skills and personalities of
employees). The assumption of monopolistic competition seems therefore to hold good in this industry.
Moreover, casual observation suggests that there is a great deal of entry and exit of hair salons. An
important source of idiosyncratic shocks is likely to be the turnover of employees.
The central prediction of our theory is that an increase in market size causes a rise in the turnover
rate of ﬁrms, and hence a shift in the age distribution towards younger ﬁrms. We test this prediction as
follows: we split our sample into small and large markets and then test if the age distribution of ﬁrms
in the subsample of small markets ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that of ﬁrms in the subsample
of large markets. Furthermore, we use information on land values to test our prediction that higher
ﬁxed costs result in higher rates of ﬁrm turnover, as evidenced by a shift in the age distribution towards
younger ﬁrms. We begin by describing the data, and then turn to non-parametric tests of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD).
7.1 Data
The 2001 edition of the Swedish Yellow Pages lists 7,243 hair salons, out of which we contacted 1,100
by phone.22 The sample contains information from interviews with 1,030 of these; the remaining were
either unwilling to participate or not possible to reach. The majority of hair salons in Sweden are
small, single establishment operations. Chains play only a minor role in the sector (our impression from
studying the Yellow Pages and discussions with a number of hairdressers is that less than ﬁve percent
of the salons are part of a chain) and we identify each establishment with a ﬁrm.
The measure of ﬁrm age is the number of years the salon has been established at the current location,
AGE. The median age in the sample is nine years (see Table 1) but the data show, as expected, a wide
21In Asplund and Nocke (2000), we tested our predictions by relating hazard rates of Swedish driving schools to market
size. This data set gave some support for the theory, but had two weaknesses. First, very few markets had more than ﬁve
ﬁrms such that the assumption of monopolisticc competition is untenable. Second, a demographic shift in the population
aged 16 to 24 years lead to a distinct decrease in market size.
22The selection was conducted as follows. Each hair salon was assigned a number, and in a ﬁrst step we randomly
selected 1,000 of these. With such a non-stratiﬁed sample, most observations are from medium to large towns. To obtain
greater representation from small markets, we randomly selected an additional 100 hair salons from the subsample of
markets (postal areas) with less than 10 hair salons. Some hair salons may have chosen not to pay to appear in the Yellow
Pages, but we believe that given the small cost (<SEK900≈ USD100) these make up only a tiny fraction of all hair salons.
23range of ages — with the 10th and 90th percentile at 2 and 25 years, respectively.23
Our theory is concerned with the eﬀects of market size on ﬁrm turnover. Finding an appropriate
measure of market size requires careful consideration. Since haircuts are not very costly and purchased
frequently, and most consumers have many nearby salons to choose from, consumers are unlikely to travel
signiﬁcant distances to purchase the service. This suggests to measure market size by the population
living in an area, and to assume that the population is solely served by the salons located within the
same area.24 The smallest areas that the Yellow Pages allow us to identify, and for which population
ﬁgures are available, are the 8,977 ﬁve-digit postal codes. At this level of market deﬁnition, however, we
are unlikely to measure market size correctly since many consumers frequent salons outside the postal
code where they reside. On the other hand, deﬁning markets very broadly, e.g., by municipalities (of
which there are 289 in Sweden), runs into the opposite problem: a municipality is likely to contain
several submarkets with little or no overlap. We have therefore decided to use an intermediate level of
aggregation, namely postal areas, to deﬁne market boundaries. Our measure of market size, MSIZE,
is then the population living within a postal area. In Sweden, there are 1,534 postal areas, ranging in
size from small villages with less than 200 inhabitants up to the three largest postal areas Stockholm,
Gothenburg, and Malmo with more than 200,000 inhabitants each. In our sample, 368 postal areas
are represented, with a median population of 7,096 inhabitants. To measure the number of ﬁrms in a
market, we use the number of hair salons listed in the Yellow Pages for a given postal area, FIRMS.
The median is 11 hair salons in a postal area.
Are postal areas a reasonable market deﬁnition for hair salons? To a ﬁrst approximation, the number
of consumers needed to make a hair salon viable should be roughly the same across markets, which would
translate into a strong correlation between population and the number of ﬁrms. The raw correlation (for
1,534 postal areas) between MSIZE and FIRMS is 0.92. In contrast, the corresponding correlation
for postal codes is only 0.16. A simple example can explain this. Consider a typical medium sized town,
which is a single postal area with 20,000 inhabitants and 20 postal codes. The center of the town has
three postal codes, and the 17 other postal codes comprise residential suburbs. Although relatively few
people live in the center, many of the hair salons are located there and, as a consequence, the majority
of the other postal codes do not have a single hair salon. This explains the low correlation between
between population and the number of ﬁrms in a postal code. Aggregating to the postal area level
reﬂects our lack of information on exactly how market demand is geographically distributed. In larger
towns (say, with a population above 100,000), there are often several centers, and so the postal area is
too broad a market deﬁnition. To sum up, the population in a postal area is an imperfect measure of
market size, but should be a suﬃciently powerful measure to allow us to distinguish between small and
large markets. Since measurement problems are likely to be most pronounced in large towns, we focus
our analysis on smaller markets.
Our paper is also concerned with the eﬀects of ﬁxed costs on ﬁrm turnover. For hair salons, the cost
of ﬂoor space is an important source of ﬁxed costs that varies considerably between, and even within,
towns. The closest proxy for which public information exists is the average assessed value per square
meter for commercial properties, RENT (collected to provide a basis for property taxation). These
data are broken down by postal code. We base our tests of FOSD on this low level of aggregation so
as to be able to measure as exactly as possible the ﬁxed costs a particular ﬁrm faces. With reference
to the example above, rents vary not only between residential suburbs and the center, but certainly
also between the three postal codes in the center. For the 890 postal codes represented in the sample,
23We also have information on whether the present owner had been previously established in the same area but at a
diﬀerent adress; approximately 40 percent of the observations fall into this category. There is no signiﬁcant correlation
between having moved location on the one hand, and ﬁrm age, market size, and land values on the other.
24The number of inhabitants in a market may not be a perfect measure of market size. Unfortunately, oﬃcial income
statistics are only broken down to the far more aggregated municipality level. The same applies to demographic information
on gender and age composition. Preferences, and thereby per capita demand, could potentially also vary across markets.
24the median is SEK 2,720/m2 and the 10th and 90th percentiles are 1,240 and 6,190, respectively. For
comparison, we also calculate a measure of the average ﬁxed costs in a postal area, RENTMEAN,b y
using the total value of commercial properties in the constituent postal codes as weights of RENT.
A potential problem of identiﬁcation is that rents tend to be increasing with town size. In the
sample, the raw correlation between MSIZE and RENT is 0.62. Also, the cost of ﬂoor space is
usually higher in the center, partly since demand is greatest there. However, since rents are not only
determined by the number of potential customers for hair salons, but by many other factors, it should
in principle be possible to separate the eﬀects of market size and ﬁxed costs. To test this assertion we
argue that, to a ﬁrst approximation, the number of ﬁrms (i) rises less-than-proportionally with market
size25, and (ii) is decreasing in ﬁxed costs (as predicted by Proposition 5). In Table 2, we report the
results from a parsimonious Tobit speciﬁcation with FIRMS as the dependent variable.26 In (2:1),
where the largest markets are excluded, the coeﬃcient of MSIZE is positive and that of MSIZE2
negative. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term MSIZE× RENTMEAN is negative and signiﬁcant,
which implies that, conditional on market size, there are fewer ﬁrms where rents are high. These results
are in line with our predictions. In (2:2), where we include all but the 11 largest markets, the coeﬃcient
of MSIZE× RENTMEAN remains negative, but the one of MSIZE2 becomes insigniﬁcant. Using
the full sample, as in (2:3), produces markedly diﬀerent coeﬃcients. As noted above, problems of
measuring market size in the large towns, and using a market average of rents, are the most likely
explanations as to why including the largest markets may distort the estimates. It is also conceivable
that we underestimate the size of the largest markets by ignoring the possibility that per capita demand
is higher there (e.g., people in big towns go more often to the hairdresser). Overall, the results suggests
that it is reasonable to focus on the smaller markets so as to reduce measurement problems.
Finally, we use regressions to check the robustne s so fo u rr e s u l t sa n de x a m i n es o m ec o m p e t i n g
explanations. The control variables we use are discussed in conjunction with the results in Table 5.
7.2 Statistical Tests of FOSD
Let Y and Z be two random variables with cumulative distribution functions FY (.)a n dFZ(.). Random
variable Y ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Z, denoted Y Â1 Z,i f
FY (ai) ≤ FZ(ai) for all ai,a n d
FY (ai) 6= FZ(ai)f o rs o m eai.
Suppose the data consist of NY and NZ independent observations from FY (.)a n dFZ(.), which form
the empirical distributions, b FY (.)a n db FZ(.).27 In the present context, b FY (.)a n db FZ(.) correspond to the
proportions of ﬁrms that are less than or equal to ai years old, in two diﬀerent subsets of markets (small
25While this is not guaranteed in our model with heterogeneous ﬁrms, numerical analysis (using the linear demand
speciﬁcation) suggests that this holds true, provided market size is not too small; see section 4.
26The speciﬁcation follows from assuming that FIRMS/ MSIZE decreases linearly in both MSIZE and
RENTMEAN. The regression equation is obtained by multiplying both sides of FIRMS
MSIZE = β1 + β2MSIZE +
β3RENTMEAN + ε with MSIZE and adding a constant. A Tobit model is used since many (mostly small) mar-
kets lack a hair salon.
27There is a subtle issue whether the observations in our data are completely independently drawn. While we have
randomly sampled about one in eight hair salons in Sweden, we drew each observation without returning it into the
“urne”. Hence, sampling an observation from one market reduces the probability of drawing again from the same market.
Moreover, the fact that one has drawn a ﬁrm of a certain age may change the expected age distribution of the ﬁrms from
the same market that remain in the urne. We believe that this does not signiﬁcantly reduce the power of our tests. First,
we have sampled only a small fraction of ﬁrms, and (due to the large number of markets) most are from diﬀerent markets.
Indeed, we have rarely sampled more than one hair salon from a small market. Second, our simple Markov process (1)
implies that, within the same market, a ﬁrm’s age is independent of its eﬃciency, and hence independent of a rival ﬁrm’s
age.
25vs. large, and low rent vs. high rent markets). To test for ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD), we
use the non-parametric procedure proposed by Davidson and Duclos (2000), which compares the two
distributions at a ﬁnite number of grid points ai, i =1 ,...,K. Anderson (1996) provides an alternative
test.
Davidson and Duclos show that, under the null hypothesis of equal distributions, b FY (ai) − b FZ(ai)
is asymptotically normally distributed, N(0, b V (ai)), with variance


















The standardized test statistic is then given by
TDD(ai)=





As the test for FOSD involves multiple comparisons (i.e., one for each grid point ai), the critical values
from the standard Student’s t-statistics are not applicable. Instead, let mα,K,∞ denote the critical value
at the α percent level of signiﬁcance of the studentized maximum modulus test with K and inﬁnite
degrees of freedom, tabulated in Stoline and Ury (1979). We accept the hypothesis of Y Â1 Z if
−TDD(ai) >m α,K,∞ for some i,a n d
TDD(ai) <m α,K,∞ for all i.
If all
¯ ¯TDD(.)
¯ ¯ are less than the critical value, we accept the null hypothesis of equal distributions. For
K =1 0a n dα =1 ,5,10,20 the critical values are 3.29, 2.80, 2.56 and 2.29. In both Table 3 and Table
4b e l o w ,a l lTDD(.) < 2.29, and so we refer to
¯ ¯TDD¯ ¯ ≡ maxi
¯ ¯TDD(ai)
¯ ¯. We also report results from
the test proposed by Anderson (1996).
7.3 Results
Table 3 shows the results for the test statistics of Anderson (1996) and Davidson and Duclos (2000). We
use 10 grid points so as to divide the age distribution for the full sample into eleven intervals with an
approximately equal number of observations (see Tse and Zhang (2000)). In the ﬁrst three columns of
Table 3, we split the sample into two (equally large) subsamples of “small” and “large” markets, and test
whether the age distribution in the subsample of smaller markets ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates
that in the subsample of larger markets. For this split, we report the Davidson and Duclos test statistic
for each of the 10 grid points, as well as the maximum value of the Anderson test statistic. We also report
the maximum value of the Davidson and Duclos test statistic when comparing the age distribution in the
smallest third of markets with that in the largest third. This split of the sample should be less sensitive
to errors in measuring market size. We refer to the Davidson and Duclos maximum test statistics under
the two splits as
¯ ¯ ¯TDD
1/2
¯ ¯ ¯ and
¯ ¯ ¯TDD
1/3
¯ ¯ ¯, and that of Anderson as
¯ ¯ ¯TA
1/2
¯ ¯ ¯. In the last three columns of the
table, we conduct analogous splits for our variable RENT. In Table 3, large negative values support
our predictions.
Before examining the statistical results it is useful to ﬁrst look at the raw data. Figure 3 shows
the cumulative frequencies of AGE in small and large markets, conditional on MSIZE <75,000 (this
corresponds to the second column in Table 3). Over virtually the entire range of ﬁrm ages, the cumulative
frequency in the set of large markets is above that in the set of small markets. This is in line with our
26prediction that ﬁrms in small markets should tend to be older than those in larger markets. Figure 4
gives the corresponding picture for the distribution of AGE in markets with low and high RENT, again
conditional on MSIZE <75,000. Here, the youngest ﬁr m st e n dt ob ei nt h es e to fm a r k e t sw i t hh i g h
rents, which is what we expect from our theory. However, the gap between the two curves narrows with
increasing age, and the two curves intersect to the left of AGE =20; at higher age, the gap between the
curves remains small.




¯ ¯ ¯ =2 .52 > 2.29 = m20,10,∞ and
¯ ¯ ¯TA
1/2
¯ ¯ ¯ =2 .67 > 2.56 = m10,10,∞. The FOSD-test becomes
signiﬁcant at the 1%-level when using the 1/3-split,
¯ ¯ ¯TDD
1/3
¯ ¯ ¯ =3 .79 >m 1,10,∞. As noted above, the result
from the 1/3-split should be more reliable as it is less sensitive to measurement problems in MSIZE.
This suggests that ﬁrms in larger markets tend to be younger (in the sense of FOSD).
In (3:2), we include all markets with up to 75,000 inhabitants. The result are now statistically
stronger: all test statistics show signiﬁcance at the 1%-level. However, including the observations from




¯ ¯ ¯ remains highly signiﬁcant. One explanation for this is that the very largest towns
contain a number of small submarkets, where competition is less intense (and hence ﬁrms are older)
than in the city center.
The last three columns of Table 3 are concerned with the eﬀects of RENT on the age distribution
of ﬁrms. In (3:4), where we restrict the sample to markets with less than 25,000 inhabitants,
¯ ¯ ¯TDD
1/2
¯ ¯ ¯ =
2.88 >m 5,10,∞. This indicates that ﬁrms tend to be younger (in the the sense of FOSD) in markets
with high ﬁxed costs, as predicted by our theory. In (3:5), t h et e s ts t a t i s t i c sf o rt h es a m p l eo fm a r k e t s
with less than 75,000 inhabitants are all signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.28 In (3:6), the same is true for the
1/2-split even when including the very largest markets. The surprisingly signiﬁcant test statistics in the
full sample may be due to the fact that our variable RENT captures diﬀerences in rents across postal
codes within the same postal area; in contrast, we assign the same value of MSIZE to all ﬁrms, even
in large towns (which may explain the less signiﬁcant results for MSIZE in the full sample).
It is encouraging that the results in Table 3 conform with our predictions. The caveat is, however,
that MSIZE and RENT are highly collinear, and so it may not be too surprising to ﬁnd similar results
in the comparisons. To address this issue, we need to separate the two eﬀects so as to verify whether
both are signiﬁcant.
Using the medians of MSIZE and RENT in markets with less than 75,000 inhabitants (which
correspond to values of 15,889 and 2,509, respectively), we split the sample into four subsamples, which
we call Q1 to Q4. Our theory makes predictions for ﬁve bilateral comparisons of age distributions across
these four subsamples. For instance, conditional on being in a small market, the age distribution of hair
salons in a low rent area should ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate that of salons in high rent areas. For
each of the four subsamples, Table 4 shows the cumulative age distributions at the ten grid points. In
the table, we also report the test statistics
¯ ¯ ¯TDD
1/2
¯ ¯ ¯ and
¯ ¯ ¯TA
1/2
¯ ¯ ¯ for the ﬁve bilateral comparisons.
Examining the test statistic for each of the ﬁve bilateral comparisons, it is striking that all are above
the critical value at the 20%-level, and most are above that of the 5%-level. The most straightforward
comparison regards Q1 vs. Q4 (small markets with low rents vs. large markets with high rents), where
the test statistics show signiﬁcance at the 1%-level. Interestingly, the test statistics for those bilateral
comparisons where MSIZE is varied and RENT is kept constant (i.e., Q1 vs. Q3 and Q2 vs. Q4),
28As seen in Figure 4, the two curves intersect to the left of AGE =20. The grid points we use are AGE =20 (in 3:5,
TDD
1/2 =0.595) and AGE =35 (in 3:5, TDD
1/2 = −0.607), and so one may ask whether our results are aﬀected by the choice of
grid points. Using AGE =28 rather than AGE =20 gives the highest value of TDD
1/2 , but it is only 0.874<2.29= m20,10,∞.
Thus, the conclusion is robust to the choice of grid points.
27tend to be more signiﬁcant than those where RENT is varied and MSIZE kept constant (i.e., Q1 vs.
Q2 and Q3 vs. Q4).
In the ﬁrst three columns in Table 5, we seek to identify the eﬀects by least squares regressions
with ln(AGE) as dependent variable (using the same cut-oﬀ levels for MSIZE as before to deﬁne the
subsamples). The coeﬃcients on ln(MSIZE)a n dl n ( RENT) are always negative, as expected, but
only the former is ever individually signiﬁcant. Again, this is caused by the collinearity between the
two, as evidenced by P-values below 0.02 for the test of the joint restriction that both coeﬃcients are
zero. The low explanatory power (adjusted R-squared around 0.01) shows that little of the variation
of ln(AGE) can be attributed to diﬀerences in market size and ﬁxed costs, which is not surprising in
markets with high entry rates.
So far, we have implicitly assumed that markets diﬀer only in terms of size and ﬁxed costs. We
acknowledge that conditions may diﬀer also in other dimensions that could inﬂuence the age distribution.
First, there are diﬀerences in demand growth, measured here by the growth rate in municipal population
and average per capita income over the period 1990-2000, POPGROWTH and INCGROWTH.29
Second, there is more mobility of population in some areas which might give rise to more frequent
shocks (c.f. the α parameter) either due to greater propensity of employees to move or change employer,
or that customer relations are less stable. Our control variable, MIGRATION, is the ratio of the
sum of inward and outward migration over the period 1990-2000 to the municipal population in 1995.
Further, the age composition of the population across markets may diﬀer, something we capture with
the fraction of the municipal population in 2000 that is aged 25 to 44, YOUNG POP. One reason for
including YO UNG PO Pis to test the alternative explanation that large markets tend to have relatively
more young people and the age of a hair salon is correlated with the age of its owner (which in turn is
correlated with the age of the population). In the last three columns of Table 3 we report regressions
with these as control variables.
Most importantly, the coeﬃcients of key variables ln(MSIZE)a n dl n ( RENT)a r eo n l ya ﬀected
to a limited extent by the introduction of the control variables and their joint signiﬁcance remains
high. This addresses the serious concern that the market size eﬀect on the age distribution is driven by
large markets being systematically diﬀerent in several dimensions. In other words, our results are not
driven by large markets being those that have grown the fastest, have the most mobility, and have the
youngest population.30 The control variables are generally statistically insigniﬁcant (INCGROWTH is
signiﬁcant at the 10%-level in column 4 but the coeﬃcient changes considerably across subsamples). The
joint restriction that all control variables are zero can not be rejected. Overall, the lack of explanatory
power of the control variables in the regressions strengthens our claim that the age distribution is driven
l a r g e l yb ym a r k e ts i z ea n dﬁxed costs, as predicted by our theory.
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that, while both market size and ﬁxed costs shape the age distribution of
ﬁrms as predicted by our theory, the eﬀect of market size seems statistically stronger. One potential
explanation for this is that our variable RENT is not only correlated with ﬁxed costs, but also with
other factors that impact the age distribution. In particular, it seems plausible that RENT is positively
correlated with the level of sunk entry costs: upon entry, a salon is required to sign a lease contract
for a minimum duration.31 Furthermore, a new ﬁrm may need a certain time in the market to reach
customers and to make an informed decision on exit. With the data at hand, we are not able to quantify
the eﬀects of RENT on ﬁxed costs and entry costs.32
29See section 5 for an examination of the eﬀects of demand growth on the turnover rate.
30In our data, MSIZE is postively correlated with POPGROWTH (ρ =0 .56), MIGRATION (ρ =0 .29), and
YO UNG PO P (ρ =0 .67). MSIZE is virtually unrelated to INCGROWTH (ρ =0 .04).
31Other costs for a hair salon do not appear to vary much across country. According to the interest organization Sveriges
Fris¨ orf¨ oretagare, wages show very little dispersion across regions. Equipment and material are typically bought from a
few national distributors.
32Note that our theory predicts that both an increase in entry costs and an increase in ﬁxed costs reduce the number
28Summing up, our study of the age distribution of hair salons in diﬀerent geographically deﬁned
m a r k e t ss u p p o r t st h ep r e d i c t i o n so fo u rt h e o r y :ﬁrms operating in larger markets, and those in locations
where rents (being a proxy for ﬁxed costs) are higher, tend to be younger (in the sense of FOSD).
Although our empirical focus has been on the determinants of ﬁrm turnover, we would like to point
out that the model contains many testable predictions on the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies. Indeed,
Syverson (2002) explores variations in within-industry productivity for a sample of four-digit industries
using a framework that builds on ours.33
8C o n c l u s i o n
Many empirical studies in industrial organization and labor economics have shown that industries diﬀer
substantially in the level of ﬁrm turnover and gross job reallocation. These diﬀerences are stable over
time and similar across countries. This suggests that there are some systematic factors that determine
the magnitude of reallocation of inputs and outputs within industries. This paper is concerned with an
examination of the role played by industry characteristics such as entry costs, ﬁx e dp r o d u c t i o nc o s t s ,
and market size on market turbulence.
To this end, we have analyzed a stochastic dynamic model of an imperfectly competitive industry.
Firms are heterogeneous and subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their “eﬃciencies”. In our formulation,
a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency can be interpreted either as its productivity or as the perceived quality of its product.
Even in a stationary environment, the equilibrium exhibits simultaneous entry and exit: currently
eﬃcient ﬁrms survive while ﬁrms with suﬃciently bad cost draws exit. Our analysis shows that the
replacement of ineﬃcient ﬁrms (“churning”) is more rapid in markets with low entry costs and high
ﬁxed costs. The most important and novel prediction of our theory, however, is that the rate of ﬁrm
turnover is positively related to the size of the market.
The paper provides a number of results in addition to those on market turbulence. Most importantly,
if the idiosyncratic shocks aﬀect ﬁrms’ productivities, then the stationary equilibrium will exhibit a
nondegenerate distribution of eﬃciency levels. That ﬁrms within an industry display considerable
heterogeneity is empirically well-documented. Our model makes a number of testable predictions on
the distribution of productivities. In particular, the model predicts that in larger markets ﬁrms tend to
be more eﬃcient. It has often been informally argued that “more intense product-market competition
fosters eﬃciency”. In our model, the induced intensity of price competition may diﬀer across markets
in that the endogenous distribution of ﬁrm types µ m a yv a r yw i t hc h a n g e si ne n t r yc o s t s ,ﬁxed costs,
or market size. However, if one were to correlate, in a cross section of markets, price-cost margins
with the average eﬃciency of active ﬁrms, one may ﬁnd a negative or positive correlation: if markets
diﬀered mainly in their ﬁxed costs, then one would ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more eﬃcient in markets with
higher price-costs margins, while the reverse would hold if markets diﬀered mainly in their size (or entry
costs).
To see the broader implications of our result on market size and ﬁrm turnover, note that an increase
in market size may be interpreted as the opening of industries to trade, e.g., as a move from two closed
economies to a fully integrated economy. In a two-country model related to ours, Melitz (1999) analyzes
the eﬀect of trade costs on the distribution of eﬃciency levels. In his model, a move from inﬁnite trade
costs to zero trade costs has no eﬀect on average eﬃciency and turnover levels. Our model, in contrast,
predicts that average ﬁrm eﬃciency and turnover levels should rise as a result of economic integration.
of ﬁrms. Thus, the ﬁnding in Table 2 that the number of ﬁrms is negatively related to RENTMEAN is consistent with
both eﬀects.
33Syverson (2000) conducts a detailed examination of the eﬃciency distribution of plants producing ready-made concrete
in the U.S., and relates the diﬀerences to variations in local demand density.
29In the empirical part of the paper, we test some of the model’s predictions. The idea is to examine
the age distribution of ﬁrms that compete in the same sector but in diﬀerent geographical markets.
This should avoid many of the measurement problems associated with cross-industry studies. To this
end, we have collected data on hair salons in Sweden. We use the population in postal areas to capture
diﬀerences in market size, and land values to proxy for diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs (primarily rents). The
empirical results are in line with the predictions. Hair salons tend to be younger in larger markets and
in markets with higher ﬁxed costs.
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32Appendix A: Proofs
Properties of the Proﬁt Function in a Cournot Model. We want to show that assumptions A.1
and A.2 hold in a homogenous goods Cournot model, where ﬁrms diﬀer in their (constant) marginal
costs. Let P(Q/S) denote inverse demand when aggregate output is Q and market size is S.W ea s s u m e
that the demand function is downward-sloping, i.e. P0(·) < 0. In equilibrium, aggregate output Q will
be some (possibly complicated) function of the vector of ﬁrms’ marginal costs, i.e. Q = Sf(c), where c
is the vector of ﬁrms’ marginal costs. It is therefore convenient to consider changes in aggregate output
which reﬂect changes in the underlying distribution of ﬁrms’ eﬃciencies. Conditional on aggregate
output Q, the equilibrium output of a ﬁrm with constant marginal cost c is denoted by Sq(c;Q). (The
function Sq(c;·) is sometimes called the backward-reaction function.) The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt
maximization is given by






The associated second-order condition is given by
2P0(Q/S)+q(c;Q)P00(Q/S) < 0. (16)
It is straightforward to show that (15) and (16) imply that a ﬁrm’s equilibrium equilibrium proﬁt
Sπ(c;Q) is strictly decreasing in industry output Q. Any change in the underlying distribution of
eﬃciencies which reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁts must induce an increase in industry output Q. Hence, an increase
in Q is equivalent to an increase in the distribution of ﬁrms as deﬁn e di nt h em a i nt e x t .M o r e o v e r ,t h e
assumption of complete ordering of distributions (ORD) is satisﬁed. Conditional on industry output Q,






We now consider an increase in the distribution of active ﬁrms: suppose aggregate output increases
from Q to Q0, Q0 >Q . Assumption A.2 says that the proﬁtr a t i oπ(c;Q0)/π(c;Q)i sd e c r e a s i n gi n
c for all c such that q(c;Q) > 0. It is immediate to see that this condition holds if and only if
P(Q0/S) <P(Q/S), which is clearly satisﬁed since the inverse demand function is downward-sloping.
Assumption A.1 requires that the proﬁtd i ﬀerence π(c;Q0) − π(c;Q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nc for all c such
that q(c;Q) > 0. Taking the derivative with respect to c, we obtain that A.1 holds if and only if
q(c;Q0) <q (c;Q), i.e. a ﬁrm’s equilibrium output is decreasing in the distribution of active ﬁrms. This
inequality is satisﬁed if
P0(Q/S)+q(c;Q)P00(Q/S) < 0,
which is equivalent to the assumption that quantities are strategic substitutes (ﬁrms’ reaction curves
are downward-sloping). It is a rather weak (and standard) assumption in Cournot models. Hence, in a
Cournot model with homogenous products and constant marginal costs, A.1 and A.2 hold under fairly
general conditions on demand.34
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step one. Consider any positive measure µ0 in M∗ such that V
e
(1;µ0) = 0. Conditions (CON) and
(FREE) ensure that µ0 exists. Since V
e
(·;µ0) is single-peaked, there are two possibilities.
34It is easy to check that assumptions (MON), (DOM), (ORD), and (CON) are satisﬁed as well. Part (i) of (FREE)
holds if limQ→∞ [P(Q)]2 /P0(Q) = 0, while part (ii) simply says that ﬁxed costs and entry costs are suﬃciently small so
as to make entry of at least one ﬁrm proﬁtable.
33(i) V
e
(c;µ0) < 0 for all c ∈ [0,1),
(ii) V
e
(c;µ0) > 0f o rs o m ec ∈ (0,1).
Step two. In case (i), there does not exist a stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit.
To see this, suppose otherwise that there exists a stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and
exit. Denote the associated stationary distribution by µ00, and the exit policy by c00.S i n c eV
e
(c;µ)i s




(c00;µ00) = 0. Since
V
e
(·;µ00) is single-peaked, we thus have ∂V
e
(c00;µ00)/∂c > 0, which contradicts condition (X). Although
there does not exist a stationary equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit, there does exist at least
one without entry and exit. From (DOM) and (CON), it follows that there exists a positive number λ0
such that µλ0 ∼ µ0,w h e r eµλ0 is the stationary distribution deﬁned by (10). (Indeed, (DOM) implies
that for λ suﬃciently large, µλ Â µ0,a n df o rλ suﬃciently small, µλ ≺ µ0. (CON) then implies that
there exists a λ0 such that µλ0 ∼ µ0.) It is easy to check that (µλ0,0,1) satisﬁes conditions (5), (7), and
(10). Note that there may exist a multiplicity of stationary equilibria. More precisely, there exists a








, forms a stationary
equilibrium.
Step three. Consider case (ii), which can only arise if φ>δ (1 − α) . We claim that, in this case,
there exists a unique stationary equilibrium, which involves simultaneous entry and exit. Existence and
uniqueness can be shown as follows. Starting from µ0, we increase the measure of active ﬁrms: in Figure
1, this shifts the curve V
e
downwards. (CON), (FREE), and single-peakedness of V
e
(·;µ)i m p l yt h a t
there exists a measure µ00 Â µ0 such that V
e
(·;µ00) assumes a unique maximum at some c∗ < 1a n d
V
e
(c∗;µ00) = 0. (It is easy to see that the exit policy c∗ is unique.) From assumptions (DOM) and
(CON), and condition (D), it follows that there exists a unique M such that µ[c∗,M] ∼ µ00. The unique
equilibrium distribution is then given by µ ≡ µ[c∗,M].35
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Abusing our previous notation, let us denote by V
e
(x;µ;ε)t h ev a l u eo f
an entrant who uses exit policy x in the period of entry and behaves optimally thereafter, when the value
of entry costs is given by ε.N o t e t h a t V
e
(x;µ;ε) is continuous (and decreasing) in ε. Assumptions
(CON) and (FREE) ensure that there exists a positive measure b µ in M∗ such that V
e
(1; b µ;0) = 0.




(b c; b µ;0)> 0=V
e
(1; b µ;0).
Hence, for   suﬃciently small, we have V
e
(b c; b µ;ε) > 0 > V
e







That is, we are in case (ii) of the proof of Proposition 2. As we have already shown there, this implies
that there exists a unique stationary equilibrium which involves simultaneous entry and exit.
Proof of Proposition 7. As pointed out in the main text, the future enters the equilibrium
conditions only through the constant option value δ  in (Et)a n d( X t). Consequently, the change in
market size in period r has no eﬀect on endogenous variables in periods before r. Moreover, again from
the discussion in the main text, c∗
t and the equivalence class of µt are independent of future and past
values of market size. The same applies to Mt + µt−1 ([0,1]). Using our comparative dynamics result
on market size, Proposition 6, we then obtain the following characterization of endogenous variables:
35If φ = δ(1 − α)  (which occurs with zero probability if the parameters are drawn from some continuous distribution),
two cases can arise: either c(µ0)=1o rc(µ0) < 1. The former case is given by (i), i.e., there exists a stationary equilibrium,
but it does not exhibit entry and exit. In the latter case, V
e(c;µ0) < 0f o ra l lc ∈ [0,c(µ0)) and V
e(c;µ0)=0f o ra l l
c ∈ [c(µ0),1]. In this case, there exists both a stationary equilibrium without entry and exit (c∗ =1 )a sw e l la sac o n t i n u u m
of equilibria with simultaneous entry and exit, where c∗ ∈ [c(µ0),1) and µ[c∗,M] ∼ µ0.
34c∗
t = c∗0
t for all t 6= r,a n dc∗
r >c ∗0
r , µt = µ0
t for all t 6= r,a n dµr ≺ µ0
r, ηt = η0
t for all t ≤ r − 1
and t ≥ r +2 ,Mr <M 0
r,a n dMr+1 >M 0
r+1 if and only if µr ([0,1]) <µ 0
r ([0,1]). The prediction on
the evolution of exit rates follows immediately. Let us now show that ηr <η 0













Since Mr <M 0




















w h i c hi st h ed e s i r e dr e s u l t . 36 The remaining characterization of the evolution of entry rates follows from
t h ed i s c u s s i o ni nt h em a i nt e x t .
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider two exit policies, c0 and c00,w h e r ec00 >c 0. The regularity







where ∆σt(c∗) ≡ σt−1(c∗)−σt(c∗), and σ0(c∗) ≡ 1. The ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h ep r o o fc o n s i s t si ns h o w i n gt h a t





















t=0 ψt(c∗) = 1. The second step in the proof consists in showing that there exists a
b t ≥ 1 such that ψt(c0) >ψ t(c00) for all t<b t,a n dψt(c0) <ψ t(c00) for all t>b t.T os e et h i s ,n o t eﬁrst that













t=0 ψt(c00), there exists some s such that ψs(c0) <ψ s(c00). Finally,









36Observe that the ﬁrst inequality implies that the result also holds when using the alternative entry measure b ηt =
G(c∗)ηt.
35This proves the assertion. The third and ﬁnal step in the proof consists in showing that A(a|c0) >A (a|c00)
for all a ≥ 1. Note that A(a|c∗)=
Pa−1
s=0 ψs(c∗) and lima→∞ A(a|c∗) = 1. From the second step,
A(1|c0) >A (1|c00). Moreover, A(a|c0)−A(a|c00)i si n c r e a s i n gi na for all a<b t+1, and decreasing for all
a>b t + 1; i.e., A(a|c0) −A(a|c00) is single-peaked in a. Since lima→∞ {A(a|c0) − A(a|c00)} = 0, it follows
that A(a|c0) − A(a|c00) > 0 for all x ≥ 1.
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S1π(c;µ1)
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Figure 2: The eﬀect of an increase of market size on gross proﬁts: S1 >S 0, and hence µ1 Â µ0.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Mean St.Dev Min 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Max Nobs
AGE 10.89 9.27 0.01 2 4 9 15 25 58 1030
MSIZE 72014 94541 355 2865 8271 27763 82788 277522 285981 1030
FIRMS 103 174 1 2 7 24 77 459 577 1030
RENT 3591 2649 209 1339 1942 2874 4370 6611 25580 1003
RENTMEAN 4338 3790 559 1547 2112 3217 4810 7608 16113 1030
POPGROWTH 0.031 0.082 -0.138 -0.068 -0.022 0.043 0.092 0.101 1.082 1030
INCGROWTH 0.336 0.041 0.255 0.288 0.311 0.328 0.357 0.393 0.555 1030
MIGRATION 0.927 0.262 0.287 0.648 0.716 0.926 1.069 1.175 2.116 1030
YOUNG POP 0.277 0.039 0.198 0.232 0.244 0.269 0.301 0.349 0.380 1030
38Table 2: Tobit regressions. The number of ﬁrms related to market size and ﬁxed costs.
FIRMS FIRMS FIRMS
MSIZE 1.2032*** 1.1838*** 0.5978***
[0.0540] [0.0380] [0.0183]
MSIZE∗ MSIZE -0.0107*** 0.0001 0.0023***
[0.0025] [0.0007] [0.0001]
MSIZE∗ RENTMEAN -0.0274*** -0.0652*** 0.0440***
[0.0104] [0.0063] [0.0025]
Constant -2.4489*** -3.0773*** -2.5400***
[0.1463] [0.1791] [0.1998]
Sample MSIZE <25 MSIZE <75 Full
N 1465 1523 1534
logL 2334.5 2890.3 3237.5
RlogL 1548.9 2067.5 3095.7
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in brackets.
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Figure 4: Cumulative age distributions in markets with low and high rents.
40Table 3: Tests of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
Compare MSIZE MSIZE MSIZE RENT RENT RENT
AGE TDD TDD TDD TDD TDD TDD
1 -2.105 -2.889 -0.246 -2.567 -2.352 -2.585
2 -2.410 -3.441 -0.349 -2.295 -3.506 -3.327
3 -2.500 -3.545 0.015 -2.880 -4.008 -2.975
5 -2.103 -4.237 -1.068 -1.983 -2.828 -3.309
7 -2.022 -4.855 -2.196 -1.516 -2.254 -2.485
9 -2.524 -3.681 -1.570 -1.048 -0.681 -1.131
12 -2.251 -4.117 -1.946 -0.977 -1.057 -0.924
15 -1.475 -3.768 -2.275 -0.186 -0.619 -1.157
20 -0.146 -1.776 -1.010 0.595 0.427 0.263
35 0.578 -0.505 -0.867 -0.607 0.000 -0.867
Max TA -2.671 -4.828 -2.307 -2.868 -3.955 -3.317
Max TDD -3.769 -3.745 -3.269 -2.951 -3.483 -3.167
(1/3-split)
Sample MSIZE <25 MSIZE <75 Full MSIZE <25 MSIZE <75 Full
N 494 762 1030 475 738 1003
Critical values at 1, 5, 10, and 20 percent levels: 3.29, 2.80, 2.56, and 2.29.
41Table 4: Tests of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
(Q1) (Q2) (Q3) (Q4)
MSIZE SMALL SMALL LARGE LARGE
RENT LOW HIGH LOW HIGH
AGE Cum.Dens. Cum.Dens. Cum.Dens. Cum.Dens.
1 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.09
2 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.20
3 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.27
5 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.38
7 0.33 0.34 0.46 0.50
9 0.57 0.50 0.67 0.68
12 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.78
15 0.74 0.67 0.82 0.84
20 0.85 0.81 0.90 0.88
35 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.98
N 257 113 112 256
FOSD test Max TDD Max TA at AGE
Q1 v Q2 -2.88 -2.30 1
Q1 v Q3 -3.19 -2.52 1
Q1 v Q4 -4.13 -4.23 3
Q2 v Q4 -3.52 -3.28 15
Q3 v Q4 -2.31 -2.60 3
MSIZE SMALL: MSIZE < 15.889. RENT LOW: RENT< 2.509.
Critical values at 1, 5, 10, and 20 percent levels: 3.29, 2.80, 2.56, and 2.29.
42Table 5: Least squares regressions. Age of ﬁrm related to market size and ﬁxed costs.
lnAGE lnAGE lnAGE lnAGE lnAGE lnAGE
(5:1) (5:2) (5:3) (5:4) (5:5) (5:6)
lnMSIZE -0.141** -0.125*** -0.036 -0.144** -0.137*** -0.073*
[0.059] [0.040] [0.030] [0.063] [0.045] [0.040]
lnRENT -0.031 -0.072 -0.085 -0.149 -0.110 -0.088
[0.116] [0.093] [0.078] [0.130] [0.105] [0.090]
POPGROWTH 0.599 0.352 0.701
[1.052] [0.826] [0.746]
INCGROWTH 3.079* -0.533 -1.714
[1.766] [1.430] [1.099]
MIGRATION 0.139 0.089 0.061
[0.299] [0.208] [0.194]
YOUNG POP -0.108 0.835 1.105
[2.956] [2.335] [2.128]
Constant 2.344*** 2.342*** 2.169*** 1.305 2.281*** 2.485***
[0.105] [0.088] [0.072] [0.940] [0.669] [0.492]
Sample MSIZE <25 MSIZE <75 Full MSIZE <25 MSIZE <75 Full
Nobs 476 738 1003 476 738 1003
Adj.R2 0.014 0.021 0.006 0.021 0.019 0.007
Test 1 0.018 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.016
Test 2 0.103 0.761 0.329
Robust standard errors in brackets
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1
Test 1 is the P-value of the restriction lnMSIZE= lnRENT=0
Test 2 is the P-value of the restriction POPGROWTH=INCGROWTH=MIGRATION=YOUNGPOP=0
43